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Abstract 
 
The key to maintaining well integrity, minimizing production decline and improving recovery 
efficiency, is to provide well services to the subsea wells (Lonnes, Williams and Burleson, 
2009). The Subsea Well Intervention (SWI) industry is a specialized segment of the 
petroleum industry, and represents a very complex work setting in the offshore environment. 
The RLWI (Riserless Light Well Intervention) and AX-S are two different types of SWI 
concepts studied in this thesis. RLWI has been used for decades, while AX-S is still in the 
commercial phase. The RLWI vessel Island Constructor and the AX-S vessel Havila Phoenix 
was chosen as the study basis.  
The SWI concepts may face challenges due to Human-Technology-Organization (HTO) 
factors which may cause consequences that might affect the decision making, work 
performance, safety and organizational goals. The purpose of this thesis is to present the 
methods for identifying and analyzing the challenges which may affect decision making and 
work performance at SWI vessels, from a human perspective. The Performance Influencing 
Factors (PIFs) and error causation paradigms with reference to the human performance model 
were used to present and identify the challenges based on the collected data from the 
interviewed SWI personnel. The thesis is a contribution to increase the focus on the wide 
range of factors that affect decision making and work performance from a human perspective, 
and it also shows that every factor may introduce different effects and consequences. 
Challenges within areas like the environment, panels and alarm, information processing, 
communication, procedures, manning, competence, planning, management, individual and 
motivation were identified.  
A proper knowledge and analysis of the complex work settings, from a human perspective, 
can give the personnel a safer and better working environment and an opportunity to improve 
their decision making and work performance. By providing the challenges presented in this 
thesis, I believe that it can contribute to improve the decision making and work performance 
conditions at the vessels performing SWI, together with an achievement of a safer and more 
productive operation. By conducting further studies within the HTO area combined with 
implementations of proactive measures, can from my point of view result in a complete “best 
decision making and work performance practice” for the different SWI concepts performing 
complex operations.  
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Basic definitions and terms 
 
Human performance model: The human performance model is an analysis which examines 
what is involved in human performance, and it gives an overview of the complex work setting 
analyzing the human, activity and context (Bailey, 1996). 
Human Factors (HF): It describes the HF technical area as a systematic analytic tool which 
includes methods and knowledge that can be used to improve, evaluate and assess the HTO 
interactions (PSA, 2011). The focus is on the human beings and their interactions with tools, 
machines, procedures, environments and workplace. 
Mistakes: Actions which occur when a plan deviates from some adequate path towards a 
desired goal (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). 
Paradigm: A collection of shared concepts, perceptions and practices that forms a particular 
view of reality, and which guides understanding, collective actions and research (Redmill and 
Rajan 1997). 
Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs): Those factors which determine the likelihood of 
error or effective human performance (Embrey, 2000). These factors are often the reason for 
human errors, and they may also affect the ability to improve and improvise work 
performance. 
Slips and lapses: Actions which deviate from the intended plan (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). 
SRK-Framework: The Skill, Rule and Knowledge-based (SRK) framework is a structured 
framework that can be used for integration of the workstation, job and organizational design 
in complex sosio-technical systems. It consists of three behavioral levels of cognitive control 
related to a decreasing familiarity with task and environment (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). 
Subsea Well Intervention (SWI): Well intervention performs measures to maintain well 
performance and integrity in the subsea well and it enables greater utilization of the resources. 
It provides higher efficiency, lower operating costs, improved production profile and 
extended life of subsea wells (Eni Norge, 2011).   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
There is over 5000 subsea production wells worldwide and the number is growing (Friedberg, 
Nordbø, Gramstad and Dalane, 2010). Ultimate recovery of reservoirs from subsea production 
systems is substantial lower than for platform production systems. Increased Oil Recovery 
(IOR) is a prioritized objective for oilfield operators. The key to maintaining well integrity, 
minimizing production decline and improving recovery efficiency, is to provide well services 
to the subsea wells (Lonnes, Williams and Burleson, 2009). The Subsea Well Intervention 
(SWI) industry is a specialized segment of the petroleum industry. Lake Erie is said to have 
had the first underwater-completed well, traced back to 1943 at a 35-ft water depth. Shell 
completed its first subsea well in the Gulf of Mexico in 1961. In the 1990s, operators began 
designing a more cost-efficient building block subsea system (PennEnergy, 2010). 
 
The subsea technology has emerged during the last decade and has enabled growth in the 
development of subsea fields in ever deeper waters. The access for well intervention is more 
complicated on subsea wells, as the x-mas trees are located on the seafloor. Subsea wells have 
been serviced in a significantly lower rate than traditional wells with dry x-mas trees, which 
in turn result in a low oil recovery and production rate. The offerings on the market today are 
dominated by Riserless Light Well Intervention (RLWI) solutions which have been used since 
the 90’s. RLWI have been performed successfully in the North Sea in shallow water up to 600 
meters (Mathiassen, Munkerud and Skeels, 2008). The frontiers of the knowledge and 
technology for riserless solutions are driven by the North Sea Alliance consisting of Island 
Offshore Subsea (IOS), FMC Technologies and Aker Well Service (AWS). Expro is in the 
end of testing their mammoth seafloor wireline system, called AX-S, and is an example of a 
new type of SWI technology not yet in commercial use. It is a seafloor based system which 
can be used at sea depths up to 3000 meters (AX-S, 2011). There are many other types of 
SWI technologies, for example the use of a rigid riser which is designed to enable coiled 
tubing (CT) and Through Tubing Rotational Drilling (TTRD). The RLWI- and AX-S 
technologies are chosen as the study basis in this thesis to limit the scope.  
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Subsea wells require some sort of intervention work every fourth year, or even more often 
(Munkerud and Inderberg, 2007). As the installed base of subsea wells has been limited until 
the last decade, well intervention has not been configured in an optimal way. The new 
challenge in the future is what type of concept will be successful in deeper water like in the 
Brazilian cost where the depth can go up 5000 meters or more. Technology development must 
be focused on solving the wellbore, cost and safety challenges, but it is also very important to 
focus on risk management and an increased knowledge and awareness from a human 
perspective together with a better understanding of the Human-Technology-Organization 
(HTO) interactions. SWI technology and risk management studies, and a focus on the human 
and HTO interactions are also considered as important in relation to future development 
potential in the industry. 
1.2 The Subsea Well Intervention main project 
The companies Deepwell AS and Polytec AS have initiated a Subsea Well Intervention (SWI) 
project for SWI technology evaluation and optimization. The project aims to develop a 
framework that incorporates technology characteristics and capabilities, risk management and 
HTO considerations into a decision support and optimization system to maximize overall 
safety and cost efficiency for SWI technology and operations. The project will help to provide 
transparency in the decision process for investing in technology, in the process of selecting 
the best concepts for specific combinations of fields and to identify barriers and bottlenecks to 
be unblocked to achieve better performance from technologies and associated methods. By 
providing an analysis of the available methods of intervention for subsea wells, one will get 
an overview of the potential or shortcomings of different technology paths associated to 
efficiency, effectiveness, reliability and safety level. An identification and analysis of 
different technological solutions for deep water SWI will be performed by exploring the 
limitations and opportunities these represent in regards to design, material integrity and 
relevant external conditions from the surface, through the water column and down into the 
wellbore. An assessment of the degree of risk associated with different SWI solutions will 
also contribute to the main objective of the project. An analysis which provides increased 
understanding from a human perspective and the interplay between human, technology and 
organization (HTO) in complex decision making and work performance matters, will help to 
“see the whole picture”, and to present a best practices for current and future SWI operation. 
This is of value to the operators and the service industry, as well as the technology providers. 
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The findings of the main project will be published in scientific journals and there will be 
made efforts to present results at industry and scientific conferences. A pilot project, which 
aims to find the specific orientation of the main project through three Master’s Theses, will 
first be conducted. The results from the pilot project will form the basis for educating three 
PhD candidates as a part of the main project, planned to start summer of 2012. 
1.3 The Subsea Well Intervention pilot project 
DeepWell and Polytec introduced three main Master’s theses topics for the pilot project: 
 
SWI - Technology       (Mohamed Ben Khemais Triki) 
SWI - Risk Management      (Einar Arthur Kolstad) 
SWI - Human Perspective     (Camilla Haraldseide) 
 
Three Master’s students were going to write and study one SWI area each through individual 
Master theses during the spring semester 2012. This Master’s thesis will consider the human 
perspective aspects of the operations at SWI vessels.  
1.4 The project partners 
1.4.1 DeepWell AS 
DeepWell AS was established in the end of 2004 and provides industrial knowledge and 
experience in well intervention and project management. The company is located at 
Avaldsnes and focus on high-tech based next generation well intervention wireline services. 
Dr. Martha Kold Bakkevig is the Director of DeepWell, and works with the SWI project. 
1.4.2 Polytec AS  
Polytec AS pursues research and development in the areas of environment, energy, 
technology, safety, gas, multiphase flow and maritime operations. They are located in 
Haugesund, and originated from Haugesund Maritime College in 1988, becoming an 
independent research institute in 1995. The Polytec Scientist Thorvald Gundersen is working 
with the SWI project. 
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1.4.3 The Stord/Haugesund University College (HSH) 
Stord/Haugesund University College (HSH) contributes with subsea engineering and 
technical safety education and knowledge. The SWI project result will be included in the 
Master’s program in Technical Safety now being developed at the University College, and 
associate Professor Jens Christian Lindaas contributes to the SWI project. 
1.5 Problem definition 
SWI work processes represent a very complex work setting in the offshore environment. 
Operations of complex technological SWI systems can affect the human in several ways 
which can lead to challenges affecting decision making processes and work 
performance. There is a need for correct decision making and effective work performance to 
achieve a safe, efficient and reliable SWI operation.  
The RLWI- and AX-S concepts may face challenges due to Human Factors (HF), including 
personnel behavior, motivation, human errors, competence, complex decision making and 
work performance, but they can also face technological challenges like complex equipment 
and software, technical limitations and implementation of new and complex technology. The 
organization challenges may include management, procedures and hierarchy issues. This can 
cause consequences which can affect the decision making, work performance, safety and 
organizational goals. When the humans in the organizations are installing and using 
equipment and software, it is important to have a good understanding of the human element 
and the work processes, and to look at the situation from a human perspective to be able to 
facilitate the workplace for the personnel to conduct the correct decisions and to achieve 
acceptable or close to optimal performance in the context that the activity is performed in. For 
the humans it may be challenging to cooperate and communicate, understand and operate, 
know the reporting lines, maintain an overview of all the incoming information, and 
simultaneously provide an acceptable work performance and correct decision making. This 
led me to the following question: 
 “How can an incorporation of a human perspective better the decision making and work 
performance at SWI vessels performing complex SWI operations?” 
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1.6 The scope 
The thesis will focus on SWI operations based challenges, from a human perspective, that 
may affect decision making and work performance carried out by the managers at the vessel 
and by the operators located in the Tower Control and operational rooms (RLWI), and in the 
Deployment Cabin, Intervention Cabin and at the Bridge (AX-S) that perform and monitor the 
operations. The RLWI and AX-S concepts will be further studied in this thesis, and the RLWI 
vessel Island Constructor and the AX-S vessel Havila Phoenix is chosen as the study basis. 
The purpose is to gather knowledge and experience from the SWI industry and to present the 
methods for identifying and evaluating the concept challenges that might have a potential to 
affect decision making and work performance. The Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) 
and the error causation paradigms will be used in the challenge identification and in the 
further analysis of the dynamic connections between the human, the activity and the context. 
The intention is to use the human performance model as a basis to provide an overview of the 
complex work setting and to help identify the challenges. The Skill-, Rule-, and Knowledge 
(SRK) framework will be used as a background to suggest solutions to the challenges, but 
various solutions from other standpoints will also be proposed. The importance of the “What, 
How and Why” questions and how they can be used to shape interview guides and thereby 
contribute to identify challenges, will also be illustrated. As a result it is desirable that the 
identified challenges, results and analysis in this thesis will contribute to a best practice to 
improve future SWI operations, from a human perspective. 
The project tasks will be further presented in this section. The reason why these tasks were 
chosen are because they, from my point of view, are the right way to reach the objectives of 
the thesis, and I see these tasks as important and relevant.  
The following project tasks will be conducted to achieve the thesis’ objective: 
1. Defining the challenges the RLWI and AX-S concepts have within the given scope. 
2. Identify where the operators and managers relevant for this thesis are located at the 
vessels, together with the workplace arrangement. 
3. This is achieved through well prepared interviews with the companies which supply the 
SWI technology, in this case Island Offshore Subsea (IOS), FMC Technologies, Aker 
Well Service (AWS), Statoil and Expro. 
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4. The challenges are defined through four paradigms; the engineering, individual, cognitive 
and organizational paradigms (Redmill, 1997) to understand and provide an opportunity 
to reduce human errors. The paradigms aim to look at the challenges from different points 
of view. The defined challenges will be viewed in the context of the human 
performance model to elaborate the challenges of the system, and to get an overview of 
the complex work setting. 
5. A fifth paradigm which I have composed, the work sociological paradigm, will also be 
presented and will be used to identify challenges. It describes team work and group 
dynamics, and will be viewed in context of the human performance model for the same 
reason as described above.  
6. The Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) perspective will also be used to identify the 
challenges within the give scope. 
7. The identified challenges need to be discussed in relation to what can be done to improve 
the working situations. In this thesis the SRK-framework is used as a background 
to propose solutions, but solutions from different viewpoints will also be suggested. 
It is desirable that the results in this thesis will contribute to a “decision making and 
work performance best practice”, from a human perspective. 
1.7 Data collection – Method 
Relevant articles, documents, brochures and presentations were gathered and relevant online 
websites and literature from academic articles and books were collected from the University 
of Stavanger library and databases. Literature studies have been performed in the research, 
which enables the opportunities to identify, evaluate and study the challenges, and to suggest 
improvement opportunities. The compendium for the University of Stavanger subject MOM 
410 Human-Technology-Organization composed by Professor Jayantha P. Liyanage, is one of 
the main literature sources in addition to the articles, websites and books listed in the 
references. The interviews for the information and result collection were directed to 
operational personnel for clarification of specific challenges of interest. The interview guide is 
given in Appendix 1. Also, visiting the Havila Phoenix vessel in “Onarheimsfjorden”, a 35 
minutes helicopter flight from Bergen Flesland, was very useful when collecting the AX-S 
information and results. In addition, a presentation of the RLWI concept, held by Morten 
Iversen from Welltec, helped to increase the understanding of the thesis theme.  
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1.8 Limitations 
The identified challenges in the SWI operators working situation are limited to the literature 
review within the scope of this thesis. When writing a Master’s thesis, time is a limiting factor 
when collecting information and analyzing the results. Also, in the beginning it was quite 
challenging to reach the correct personnel to be able to conduct the interviews. They are busy, 
and they have many important tasks which must be performed, but in the end the right 
personnel were reached and interviewed with success. I also want to mention that I am a 
student and not a professional within the areas studied in this thesis, but through the literature 
studies, visits and presentations I feel that I have developed a good understanding and 
knowledge within the scope of the thesis. 
The intention is not to study and develop technological and pure organizational based 
challenges and solutions. This thesis studies challenges from a human perspective, and critical 
factors potentially contributing to human errors. It also proposes solutions to the identified 
challenges potentially affecting decision making and work performance. The thesis touches 
the organizational element through the PIFs and the error causation paradigms (allocation of 
responsibility, management, standardization, team structure, procedures etc.), but the human 
perspective is the main focus.  
There are some limitations in the AX-S results, due to the fact that the concept is not yet 
commercialized and is still in a testing phase. Therefore, the AX-S personnel could not 
answer all of the questions with the same amount of background experience as the RLWI 
personnel. Also, when identifying the challenges at a RLWI vessel, some choices had to be 
made. There are several vessels performing RLWI operations, and the alliance between IOS, 
FMC and AWS are operating three vessels. The Island Constructor vessel was chosen to be 
studied in this thesis, but in addition some results were gathered from the two other vessels, 
the Island Frontier and the Island Wellserver.  
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2. State of the Art and Literature Review 
This chapter will first present the Subsea Well Intervention (SWI) technology concepts 
followed by a presentation of the vessels and the personnel’s workplace arrangement. After 
this, the reader will gain an insight into the human performance model, decision making, 
work performance, PIFs and the error causation paradigms. Finally, a presentation of the 
HTO- and HF perspectives will be provided, followed by a description of the SRK-framework 
and an illustration of the use and importance of the “What”, “How” and “Why” questions.  
2.1 Subsea Well Intervention (SWI) 
The SWI Industry is a specialized segment of the petroleum industry. There is a demand for 
an efficient well intervention system in order to increase oil recovery. Currently a number of 
technology tracks are under development addressing the service requirements for subsea 
wells. To have a future deep-water intervention system which is both technically and 
commercially successful, it is important and critical to have a well thought out concept 
selection (Browning and Moss, 2006). 
Effectiveness, risk and cost balance is common to every offshore project, but this is especially 
true for SWI where success might include a broader spectrum of outcomes, and risks may be 
more difficult to quantify (Hurzeler, 2010). Well intervention provides higher efficiency, 
lower operating costs, improved production profile and extended life of subsea wells (Eni 
Norge, 2011). Figure 1 show a improved production profile when performing interventions.  
 
Figure 1: Illustrates production profile improvement when performing interventions (Welltec, 2012). 
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SWI also enables greater utilization of the resources, and the technology also allows a 
reassessment of the unprofitable oilfields because intervention costs are reduced and the 
recovery rate is improved. It provides the possibility of the cost saving opportunity of using 
vessels, instead of renting MODUs (Mobile Offshore Drilling Units). The intervention costs 
are therefore reduced by 1/3, resulting in better exploration of the subsea wells and enabling 
more intervention work (Island Offshore, 2012). Figure 2 illustrates that intervention costs are 
significantly lower when using vessels, compared to MODUs. Another benefit is that vessels 
are much easier to move than a moored rig. 
  
Figure 2: Intervention cost comparison for some vessels and big mobile units (Eni Norge, 2011). 
The complex ship based RLWI- and AX-S concepts, belonging to the Category A in figure 3, 
will be further presented later in this chapter. Complex systems are characterized by the fact 
that subsystems interact. RLWI and AX-S is complex, not only because of the complex 
technology, but because of the many subsystems, teams, operators and clients involved in the 
operation with different tasks, communication structures and responsibilities. An important 
issue is how to provide an integrated service team and to establish onboard the vessel a safe 
and efficient working environment (Jøssang, Friedberg and Buset, 2008). 
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Figure 3: Illustrates the Category A, B and C well intervention technologies, and the difference between 
RLWI, heavy intervention rig and conventional rigs (Fjærtoft and Sønstabø, 2011) 
2.1.1 Riserless Light Well Intervention (RLWI) 
The offerings on the market today are dominated by Riserless Light Well Intervention 
(RLWI) solutions which have been used for decades. FMC Technologies has developed the 
RLWI technology which enables maintenance and inspection in a more optimal way (NTVA, 
2005), and they have developed and operated RLWI equipment in the North Sea since 2003. 
Statoil was the first company to qualify the RLWI technology.  
RLWI provides safety gains including avoidance of hydrocarbon transportation to the facility 
at the surface, but it also experience safety challenges due to complex operations and the need 
of special knowledge and control in every part of the preparation and execution. Figure 4 
shows FMC’s RLWI concept. RLWI units are optimal for installation and manipulation, 
repair and scale removal of some equipment (such as valves, plugs, etc.), fluid sampling, re-
perforations, zone isolation, chemical treatment and well abandonment, among other services 
(DNV, 2010). 
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Figure 4: The company FMC’s RLWI concept (Eni Norge, 2011). 
RLWI has been performed successfully in the North Sea up to 600 meters (Mathiassen, 
Munkerud, Skeels, 2008). It is a great need for RLWI technology both nationally and 
internationally with a growing number of subsea wells with now over 5000 worldwide. 
The groundbreaking part of RLWI is the use of cables instead of the riser, which then allows 
vessels to perform the intervention. This saves huge costs for the oil industry (NTVA, 2005). 
The figures 5-8 shows the different main parts of the RLWI concept. 
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Figure 5: The Pressure Control Head and the Upper 
Lubricator Package (FMC Technologies, 2008) 
  
Figure 6: The subsea Lubricator, the Lower Lubricator 
Connector and the Well Control Package (FMC 
Technologies, 2008)  
Pressure Control Head 
The Pressure Control Head (PCH) 
is connected on the top of the 
lubricator section, and it functions 
as a pressure barrier. It consists of 
the wireline flow tubes and 
emergency packing elements. It 
also seals around the wire towards 
the pressure in the wellbore during 
operations (Jøssang, Friedberg and 
Buset, 2008). It can keep oil and 
gas to remain inside the PCH and 
well if the grease pressure is higher 
than the existing well pressure. 
 
Upper Lubricator Package 
The Upper Lubricator Package 
(ULP) provides a barrier element 
during intervention of the well and 
is connected between the PCH and 
lubricator (Jøssang, Friedberg and 
Buset, 2008). The PCH and ULP 
gives dynamic sealing against 
running wireline. The ULP is 
equipped with Shear Seal Ram 
which has the capacity to cut all 
slick and braided wires.  
Lubricator 
The Lubricator (LUB) Tubular is a 
temporary storage position for the 
wireline tool string on its way 
down into the well, or on the way 
out. It is a tubular section capable 
of storing a 22 meter long 
toolstring. It is used to house 
wellwork toolstring lowered into it 
from the surface (Jøssang, 
Friedberg and Buset, 2008).  
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Figure 7: Lower Lubricator Connector Package 
(Welltec, 2012) 
           
 Figure 8: Well Control Package (Island offshore, 2009). 
 
  
Lower Lubricator Connector 
The Lower Lubricator Connector 
(LLC) provides a well safety 
barrier and connection to the 
lubricator section and to the WCP 
(Jøssang, Friedberg and Buset, 
2008).  It acts as a safety joint 
capable to disconnect the lubricator 
section from WCP, by remotley 
operated disconnect connector.  
Well Control Package 
The Well Control Package (WCP) 
has many functions and enables 
well control during wireline 
operations (Jøssang, Friedberg and 
Buset, 2008). The WCP is the 
heaviest module and consists of 
shear/seal ram able to cut wireline, 
wireline tool string and coiled 
tubing. It also supplies hydraulic 
pressure to the x-mas three 
functions, and is equipped with a x-
mas three connector, which 
function as an interface between 
the WCP and x-mas three re-entry. 
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2.1.2 AX-S - Seabed system 
Expro’s AX-S team has their offices in Westhill, Aberdeen. Expro is in the end of the testing 
of their AX-S mammoth seafloor wireline system. It is a new type of seafloor based concept 
not yet in commercial use. It can operate in depths up to 3000 meters and negates the need of 
rig and riser systems by using remote intervention from a dedicated monohull vessel 
(Svensen, Williamson and Law, 2011). The wireline winch and well control systems are 
located on the seafloor with no tension lines between subsea systems and vessel, hence no 
vessel motions transferred to the subsea system. Figure 9 shows the packages that are 
deployed onto the subsea tree, and the figures 10-14 illustrates the packages individually. 
  
Figure 9: The company Expro’s seabed concept, AX-S. Right picture (DNV, 2011); left picture (AX-S, 
2011).  
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   Figure 10: The Running Tool (AX-S, 2011). 
 
      
  Figure 11: The Fluid Management Package (AX-S, 2011). 
              
Figure 12: The Wireline Winch Package (AX-S, 2011). 
Fluid Management Package  
The Fluid Management Package 
(FMP) is the final subsea section 
and can deploy glycol fluid into the 
system to flush out hydrocarbons 
which are then circulated back into 
the well or subsea production 
system. The FMP contains the 
Glycol Chemical Injection Unit 
which provides glycol (and/or 
filtered seawater) for pressure 
testing and purging to help prevent 
hydrate formation. Methanol 
injection (for the dissolution of 
hydrates) is provided from an ROV 
skid (DNV Energy Report, 2011). 
 
Running Tool 
The AX-S deployment has a 
Running Tool (RT) in which the 
four main AX-S packages is 
deployed and recovered. The 
running tool is a load-bearing ROV, 
and it mechanically latches to all 
the packages through the four 
corner posts of their support frames 
(DNV Energy Report, 2011).  
 
Wireline Winch Package 
The Wireline Winch Package 
(WWP) is a winch with pressure 
housing and the tools are run in the 
well by the WWP. The winch has 
25,000ft of mono-conductor which 
conveys the various intervention 
tools into the well (DNV Energy 
Report, 2011). 
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     Figure 13: The Tool Storage Package (AX-S, 2011). 
 
                  
Figure 14: The Well Control Package (AX-S, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
Tool Storage Package 
The Tool Storage Package (TSP) is 
a subsea warehouse with fast, 
remote tool change-out where tools 
are swapped at seabed. The TSP 
contains eight tool pockets which 
are located around the inner 
circumference of the package, and 
the tool are swapped on the seabed 
(DNV Energy Report, 2011). 
 
The Well Control Package 
 
The Well Control Package (WCP) 
is the dual safety barrier with 
standard interfaces, and contains 
industry-proven shear seal and gate 
valves. The operator has time to 
identify the problem if any safety 
issues arise, as the system is fully-
enclosed pressure housing with no 
dynamic seals between wellbore 
and surrounding environments 
(DNV Energy Report, 2011). 
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2.1.3 The Subsea Well Interventions Vessels 
Today, one type of vessel, the Havila Phoenix, is planned to perform AX-S operations for the 
company Expro since this is a new type of concept not yet commercialized. In contrast, there 
are several vessels performing RLWI operations since this technology has been used for 
decades. The North Sea Alliance consisting of Island Offshore Subsea (IOS), FMC 
Technologies and Aker Well Service (AWS) are the frontiers of the knowledge and 
technology for RLWI solutions. The Island Frontier, the Island Constructor and the Island 
Wellserver are RLWI vessels performing workovers. The three companies operate on these 
three RLWI vessels under a joint alliance. Statoil is a client for interventions in the North Sea. 
An overview of some of the vessels performing RLWI and AX-S operations are shown in 
table 1.  
Table 1: An overview of some of the vessels performing interventions operations. 
Vessels/Companies FMC 
Technologies 
Island 
Offshore 
Aker 
Solutions 
Expro 
Group 
WellOps 
Island Frontier 
(RLWI) Year 2004 
         
Island Wellserver 
(RLWI) Year 2008 
        
Island Constructor 
(RLWI) Year 2008 
        
Seawell              
(RLWI) Year 1987 
      
Well Enhancer 
(RLWI) Year 2009 
      
MODU Q4000           
(RLWI) Year 2002 
      
Havila Phoenix        
(AX-S)  Year 2009 
      
 
Seawell, Well Enhancer and MODU Q4000 are RLWI vessels operated by the company 
WellOps, but will not be further discussed due to the thesis’s scope.  
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The project task number two, presented earlier, was to identify where the personnel relevant 
for this thesis are located at the vessels together with the workplace arrangement. I have 
chosen to present this location and arrangement in this section, since it fits quite well here 
when presenting the different vessels. The ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle) personnel 
location will be presented shortly, but will not be further studied due to the thesis’ scope. 
The RLWI Vessels: The Island Frontier, Island Constructor and Island Wellserver 
The Island Frontier, Island Contructor and Island Wellserver vessels are capable to meet and 
fulfill some of the toughest requirements in the industry and have been built for worldwide 
operation (Island Offshore, 2012). The Island Constructor will be the main study basis for the 
RLWI part of this thesis, but the Island Frontier and the Island Wellserver will also be 
presented shortly. The vessels main activities are: 
- Well intervention services with subsea lubricator system (LWI/RLWI) 
- Subsea construction and equipment installation 
- Inspection, Maintenance and Repair (IMR) 
- ROV services 
 
The Island Frontier 
The Island Frontier is designed as an offshore construction and Light Well Intervention 
vessel, and was delivered by Sørviknes Verft AS in 2004 (Island Offshore, 2012). This vessel 
is the oldest vessel compared to the Island Constructor and the Island Wellserver, which both 
are produced in 2008. The installation is able to fulfill subsea installation and module 
handling operations, RLWI services, trenching and ROV operations (Island Offshore, 2012). 
Its accommodation is 72 persons. Figure 15 shows the Island Frontier. 
 
                     Figure 15: The Island Frontier, delivered in 2004 (PSA, 2006). 
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The Island Frontier personnel location and workplace arrangement 
The following personnel have their workplace located in the Tower Control on deck next to 
the moonpool: 
 Tower operator  
 Wireline operator 
 
The tower operator sits next to the wireline operator and they have an overview to the deck 
work area from the Tower Control. 
 
The following personnel have their office spaces located in other operational rooms (in the 
recidential part), elsewhere than the Tower Control: 
 Well Intervention Superintendent (WIS)  
 Well Intervention Supervisor (WIS)  
 Statoil supervisor  
 FMC supervisor  
 WOCS operator 
 ROV operator 
 Service personnel 
 
The Well Intervention Superintendent (WIS) (IOS) reports to the onshore facility, where the 
Operations Managers have their offices. The Well Intervention Supervisor (WIS) (IOS) 
reports to the Well Intervention Superintendent (WIS). The operators report to the supervisors 
and to the Well Intervention Superintendent (WIS). Note that the “WIS” abbreviation is used 
for both the Well Intervention Superintendent and the Well Intervention Supervisor and this 
applies to all three vessels. 
The Well Intervention Supervisor (WIS) sits at the WIS control desk in between the ROV and 
WOCS (Workover Control System) operator in the recidental part of the vessel. The Well 
Intervention Superintendent (WIS) also has his/her office in the residential part at the floor 
above the WIS control. The Statoil supervisor has an office next to the Well Intervention 
Superintendent and the FMC supervisor has his/her office at the floor underneath the WIS 
control. The service personnel have their office in the landscape in the recidental part next to 
the WOCS office.  
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The Island Constructor 
The Island Constructor is a Well Intervention Unit delivered in 2008 from Ulstein Verft AS 
(Ulsteingroup, 2008) and is the main study basis for the RLWI concept in this thesis. It has 
been designed as an offshore construction and Light Well Intervention Vessel, and is able to 
fulfill construction work, tower and module handling, installation work, IMR work, survey, 
crane and diving (Island Offshore, 2012). All of the navigation and communication equipment 
is delivered and installed by Ulstein Elektro (Maritimt Magasin, 2012). Its accommodation is 
90 persons and has already experience from several types of subsea projects (Island Offshore, 
2012). Figure 16 shows the Island Constructor. 
 
 
              Figure 16: The Island Constructor, delivered in 2008 (Island offshore, 2010). 
The Island Wellserver 
The Island Wellserver was delivered the same year as the Island Constructor from Aker Yards 
Langsten (Maritimt Magasin, 2012). The installation is able to fulfill RLWI, installation and 
module operations, trenching, ROV operations, construction work and diving (Island 
Offshore, 2012). The vessel is equipped with a moonpool for the handling of subsea 
equipment, and a Launch and Recovery System (LARS) for handling ROV. MHS (Module 
Management system) is included in the tower (Maritimt Magasin, 2012). Its accommodation 
is 97 persons, and all navigation and communication equipment are provided by O. Øverland 
in Molde. Figure 17 shows the Island Wellserver. 
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                  Figure 17: The Island Wellserver, delivered in 2008 (PSA, 2009). 
The Island Constructor and the Island Wellserver personnel location and workplace 
arrangement 
The following personnel have their workplace located in the Tower Control on deck next to 
the moonpool: 
 Well Intervention Supervisor (WIS)  
 WOCS operator 
 Tower operator  
 Wireline operator 
 Service personnel 
 
Figure 18 shows the location of the Tower Cabin at the Island Constructor, which will be 
studied in this thesis. The tower operator sits in between the WOCS and wireline operator and 
they have an overview to the rest of the work area from the Tower Control, while the Well 
Intervention Supervisor (WIS) sits in the back in his/her own office. This is shown in figure 
19. The figure also shows the AWS and FMC desk location. The Schlumberger logging 
personnel are also located here. 
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Figure 18: The Tower Control cabin at the Island Constructor. The picture was received from IOS to be 
used in this thesis. 
 
Figure 19: The Tower Control where RLWI operations are performed. The picture was taken at the 
Island Constructor vessel to be used in this thesis. 
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The following personnel have their office spaces located in other operational rooms (in the 
recidential part called “A-Deck”), elsewhere than the Tower Control: 
 Well Intervention Superintendent (WIS)  
 Statoil supervisor  
 FMC supervisor  
 ROV operator  
 
The FMC supervisor has his/her desk in between the Statoil supervisor and the Well 
Intervention Superintendent (WIS) in the recidental part called “A-Deck”. The ROV sits in 
his/her own big separate ROV room with all ROV pilots and screens collected next to the 
Well Intervention Superintendent (WIS). Operations managers are located primary onshore. 
 
The difference is that the Island Constructor and the Island Wellserver has the Well 
Intervention Supervisor (WIS), WOCS operator and service personnel located in the Tower 
Control, in addition to the tower operator and wireline operator, while the Island Frontier only 
have the tower operator and wireline operator located in the Tower Control. All three vessels 
have additional personnel at the vessel such as the Offshore Installation Manager (The 
Captain, OIM), the deck crew, the marine crew and the service personnel responsible for 
logging and tractor.  
The RLWI Control System 
The Control System enables remote control of the RLWI subsea well intervention operation. 
Depending upon the required function operated through Human Machine Interface - HMI, 
there is a combination of manual and automated system. The Control System communications 
system and remote control of subsea intervention operations performed by the operators in the 
Tower Control are shown in figure 20 and 21.  
The Tower Control is a communication interface and includes power distribution, real-time 
computers and software. FMC WOCS (Workover Control System) provision for control 
during intervention is also included in the control system. This operator maintains, test and 
control subsea stack and related topside equipment. They operate and monitor well and subsea 
stack during operation from the Control System, and they also redress and test PCH between 
wireline runs. 
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Figure 20: The WOCS and wireline operator’s panels and seats. The pictures are taken at the Island 
Constructor vessel to be used in this thesis. 
 
Figure 21: The tower operator panels and seats. The picture is taken at the Island Constructor vessel to be 
used in this thesis. 
The Island Offshore tower operator handle tower winch and cursor frames during installation 
and retrieval of subsea equipment from the Control System remote control. The wireline unit 
is operated by the wireline operator from the Control System in the tower control. The ROV 
Oceaneering operator handles ROV from the Control System on directions from Well 
Intervention Supervisor (WIS), FMC or Aker.  
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The AX-S Vessel: The Havila Phoenix  
The Havila Phoenix is a Havyard 858 design subsea construction vessel. It was built at the 
Havyard Leirvik facility in Norway and delivered in 2009 (DNV Energy Report, 2010). The 
vessel is planned to conduct well intervention activities using Expro designed AX-S system. It 
is able to fulfill well intervention services, subsea construction and equipment installation, 
Inspection, Maintenance and Repair (IMR) and ROV services. The living quarters are located 
forward and provide accommodation for up to 114 people (Havila, 2011). The core crew is 
expected to be 63 persons (DNV Energy Report, 2011). Ulstein Elektro has delivered 
navigational and communication equipment. Figure 22 shows the Havila Phoenix. 
 
 
                Figure 22: The Havilia Phoenix vessel (AX-S, 2011). 
The Havila Phoenix personnel location and workplace arrangement 
Aside from the management there are projects, intervention, deployment, maintenance, and 
deck and ROV departments within the AX-S operating team at the vessel. Operations 
managers are located onshore, while the different supervisors (shift supervisor, well 
intervention supervisor, deployment supervisor and ROV supervisor etc.) and deck team are 
located offshore at the vessel. The deployment supervisor, interventions supervisor, 
maintenance leader, ROV supervisor and their teams and the deck foremen, reports to the 
shift supervisor. The shift supervisor report to the project engineer and to the Offshore 
Installation Manager (The Captain, OIM). The onshore operational manager is on top in the 
reporting hierarchy after the AX-S Managing Director.  
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The vessel has two cabins on deck, the Deployment Cabin and the Intervention Cabin. The 
Deployment Cabin is stationed above deck overlooking the handling system, to be able to 
oversee all operations on deck and in the tower/moonpool. Figure 23 shows the location of the 
Deployment- and Intervention Cabin and their inside layout is illustrated in figure 24 and 25. 
The Intervention Cabin is placed under the Deployment Cabins and is hid in the picture. The 
deployment supervisor and the deployment team are located in the Deployment Cabin, while 
the well interventions supervisor is located in the Intervention Cabin together with the team. 
At the Bridge the shift supervisor is stationed, together with Dynamic Positioning (DP) team, 
survey and other crew members. The Bridge provides a central controlling station for the AX-
S system, coordinating subsea and marine activity. Station keeping is handled with the use of 
DP. The vessel also has two ROV shacks, with a team of three people in each shack. 
 
        
Figure 23: The location of the Deployment Cabin. The Intervention Cabin is placed straight under this 
cabin. The picture was received from Expro to be used in this thesis. 
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Figure 24: The Deployment Cabin showing the panels and the operators view. The picture was received 
from Expro to be used in this thesis. 
 
Figure 25: Subsea Intervention Cabin layout where the WOCS, wireline and other intervention operations 
are performed. The pictures were received from Expro to be used in this thesis. 
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The AX-S Control System 
The Control System enables remote control of the AX-S subsea well intervention operation. 
The system is based on subsea deep water ROV controls architecture and components, and it 
comprises all hydraulic controls including subsea hydraulic power units (HPUs) and valves, 
electronic signal communication, the wireline winch electric drive, power distribution and 
data collection. There is a remote control of the subsea intervention operations with touch-
screen fly-by-wireline control. The handling system is controlled via the control room on 
deck. There is a combination of manual and automated system depending upon the required 
function operated through Human Machine Interface - HMI (AX-S, 2011). 
 
The Control System also includes acoustic communications system, remote control of subsea 
intervention operations and wireless telemetry (health check) system during AX-S 
intervention operations. Workover Control System (WOCS) provision for the well head/tree 
control during intervention is also included in the Control System (AX-S, 2011). All control 
of the subsea tree will be “local” if required by utilizing the AX-S WOCS or Tree Vendor 
WOCS or host platform specific to the type of subsea tree to be interfaced with during the 
intervention operation.  
 
The interventions team is responsible for running of the subsea AX-S system, well control 
operations and wireline (electric-line & mechanical services) operations. The deployment 
team is responsible for safe handling of the deck handling system, running tool operation and 
deployment of the AX-S subsea packages. They operate the automated handling system 
which consists of back deck transfer, tower, main winch with rope and running tool. The 
wireline carry out the downhole operations. This may involve testing and recoding readings 
which give data that can be used for reservoir analysis and remedial works. Figure 25 and 26 
shows some of the control systems layout in the Deployment- and Intervention Cabins. 
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Figure 26: The control system layout in the Deployment Cabin presented at the screens. The pictures were 
received from Expro to be used in this thesis. 
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2.2 Human and Organizational issues 
2.2.1 The Human Performance Model  
The human performance model is an analysis which examines what is involved in human 
performance and it gives an overview of the complex work setting. It helps to spot factors that 
may have a large potential to contribute to work performance (Bailey, 1996). The model can 
thereby contribute to identify human and organizational issues.  
Performance can be divided into two levels (Bailey, 1996): 
 The perfect performance 
 The acceptable performance 
 
The human performance is the activities carried out by the system’s human elements (Reason, 
1997). Few designers have the requirements and resources to design for optimal performance, 
but they must be able to ensure an acceptable level of human performance. Work performance 
will be further described in section 2.4. One can take into account the following components 
to achieve a near perfect or acceptable level of human performance (Bailey, 1996):  
 
 The general state or condition of the human 
 The activity being performed (including required equipment or tools)  
 The context in which the activity is performed 
 
In other words, to predict human performance and to achieve an acceptable or close to 
optimal performance, one has to understand the human, the activity the human performs and 
the context the human performs the activity in. The human performance model is shown in 
figure 27. The interfaces and interactions between the human, activity and context 
components are also important to study. In human-machine activities the interaction between 
the human and activity component are a critical interface, while organizational barriers can 
create interface problems by providing resistance to change, or that the management does 
not pay attention to or reward good user interfaces. It is also important to understand that it is 
equally important to assess the human, activity and context together, and the interactions 
between them, as to study them separately (Bailey, 1996).  
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Figure 27: The Human Performance Model. 
The Human 
The human is the most complex of the three elements in the human performance model 
(Bailey, 1996). The sensors (vision, hearing, etc.), the brains at cognitive level (the ability to 
think, find reasons and make decisions) and the responders (arms, fingers, mouth, etc.) are 
considered in the human component. The designers do not know the humans who will work in 
their systems, but it is important to understand and implement in the design how people 
sense, respond and process information (Bailey, 1996). 
Human performance can be affected in a negatively and positively way, where reduced 
performance would be expected for example because of poor sleep, unsatisfactory hearing, 
unacceptable behavior (due to for example lack of motivation, conflicts, attitude), 
poor eyesight or lack of abilities. The following excerpts shows as an example were lack of 
knowledge, abilities and wrong attitude may be an obstacle for correct decision making and 
acceptable performance: 
“One day a very very senior manager of the Dow Chemical Company walked into the control 
room of an ethylene production plant. He pointed to a pipe rack in the production area and 
asked an operator, “Tell me, what would you do if the flange on that ethylene line cracked 
and ethylene poured all over the deck?” “Well.” said the operator. “Unless there is a shut off 
valve in the car park. Nothing!”.” (From Chambers, 2005) 
 
Attitude, knowledge and ability limitations illustrate how the human capabilities and response 
to an unexpected situation may hinder them to achieve the main purpose of the task. 
Incorporating a Human Perspective into Subsea Well Intervention (SWI)  
Decision Making and Work Performance at SWI vessels 
32 
 
The designer or engineer should understand the human qualities, characteristics and 
deficiencies, and in the best possible way take them into account when producing the system 
and making decisions.  They have to handle the strengths and weaknesses expected in an 
expected population of users (Bailey, 1996). 
The Activity 
The next component is the activity performed, and includes any required tools or equipment 
(Bailey, 1996). The designer controls the conditions of performance and execution of the 
activity, and must know and control the factors that affect performance, both positively and 
negatively.  It is important to know which types of work can be performed by people and 
what can best be performed by computer- or automation systems. To build sufficient skills for 
an acceptable or near perfect level of human performance, it is important to know what kind 
of training is required and needed for the human to perform the activity.  
The Context 
The context in which humans perform the activity may affect performance and can make a 
big difference for human performance. Working conditions must be provided to enable the 
operators to function efficiently without distraction to ensure a safe operation of the system, 
and it is also important to match the system to the mental ability and skills of the staff (Wong, 
2002).  Bailey (1996) defines the context as “the circumstances in which an event occurs” 
and three context considerations are described: 
 
 The physical context  
 The social context  
 The psychological context 
 
Physical context 
The physical context includes the location and the environmental conditions. Examples are 
noise level, temperature, lighting, vibration and pollution. Noise is probably the single most 
studied factor in the physical context (Bailey, 1996).   
Social context  
The social context includes conditions that may affect human performance, such as the effects 
of other people, crowding, isolation and
 
clustering (Bailey, 1996).  
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Psychological context 
The psychological context may affect human behavior (Wong, 2002). Humans have emotions 
that can influence the way they behave and how they respond to the culture at work. It is 
important to have attention on developing a safety culture, including training and education 
related to the work performed.  
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2.3 Decision making  
2.3.1 Potential decision making challenges and risks 
The decision making processes at the SWI vessels are very complex due to close couplings, 
interactions and dependency between system components which may make it difficult for 
decision makers to keep an overview of the critical events. Many activities take place in 
parallel in complex systems and these parallel activities may interact in non-obvious manners 
if the system is characterized by high interactive complexity (Rossnes, Guttormsen, Steiro 
Tinmannsvik and Herrera, 2004). This may lead to risks due to an increased probability of 
taking the wrong decisions with serious consequences. Serious accidents may occur because 
decision making has been deficient due to that a incorrect decision was taken or because no 
decision was taken when required. According to Hollnagel (1984) the decisions the person 
makes can shape the performance.  
Today, operation centers may have more real-time data than their capacity, and offshore 
personnel have to cope with more information from the operation centers than they can handle 
(Grøtan and Albrechtsen, 2008). Decisions are often taken at a distance from the actual 
operation without a proper understanding and knowledge of the work settings. The condition 
under which decisions are made, strongly influence the outcomes and decision processes 
(Rossnes, 2001). According to the Sintef report (2008) written by Grøtan and Albrectsen, the 
real-time availability for a wide range of expertise from all stakeholders together with new 
forms of decision support, can lead to "the more cooks, the more mess". Communication and 
cooperation problems, conflicting objectives and a demand of unnecessary information or too 
little information can cause risks. Also, more group-based decision making may obscure who 
is responsible for performing the action.  
2.3.2 Two dimensions and five categories for decision making 
Some decisions are made at the “sharp end” close to the hazard sources, while others are 
made at the “blunt end” away from the hazard sources (Rossnes, Guttormsen, Steiro 
Tinmannsvik and Herrera, 2004), illustrated in figure 28. The different categories of human 
decision making and action can be defined in several ways (Hollnagel, 1984): 
 decisions in situations that are familiar and frequent 
 decisions in situations that are familiar but infrequent 
 decisions in situations that are unfamiliar and infrequent 
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According to Rossnes, Guttormsen, Steiro, Tinmannsvik and Herrera in the Sintef report 
(2004), one expects decision criteria, procedures and outcomes to be related to two 
dimensions, presented in figure 28: 
 Proximity to the hazard source (operators facing a gas leak is in a different situation 
than the designer of the system) 
 Level of authority (who can give orders and directives to whom) 
Many managers will move to the right in figure 28 in crisis situations and take a more 
operational role and even "sharp-end" - decisions, which under normal conditions are left to 
the operator (Rossnes, 2001).  
 
Figure 28: Five classes of decision processes (Rossnes, Guttormsen Steiro, Tinmannsvik and Herrera, 
2004; Rossnes, 2001). 
Figure 28 also illustrates that the introduction of the two dimensions can help to simplify 
the range of decision situations into five rough categories (Rossnes, 2001): 
1. Political and bureaucratic decision making is applicable in situations characterized by 
conflict of interest. This conflict is between the parties who have roughly equal power 
in relation to the decision. Typical decision problems may be inconsistency, non-
optimal decisions and erosion of safety margins (Rossnes, 2001). 
2. Managerial or satisficing decision making characterizes many management decision 
makers that does not have the capacity to search for the optimal action alternative. The 
manager therefore chooses the first acceptable alternative. The working day for 
managers at high levels are characterized by many decisions, lack of time and 
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large amounts of information to be handled. Typical decision problems are inadequate 
problem definitions and erosion of safety margins (Rossnes, 2001).   
3. Bureaucratic planning or optimization means that one under the given constraints seek 
optimal decision alternative based at models that do not capture the reality together 
with incomplete knowledge. Designers, planners and risk analysts often have 
sufficient time to focus on optimization, but they often lack experience with the 
systems they are working with. Other problems may be unrealistic assumptions, 
limited feedback, deficient models and erosions of safety margins (Rossnes, 2001). 
4. Routine operations decision may lead to conflicting objectives between process 
operators and others who work close to sources of danger. The most of the time they 
have a focus on operating efficiently, avoidance of interruption and keeping their 
workload to an acceptable level.  The routine decisions can be fully automated or 
programmed through procedures and instructions. Typical problems may be slips, 
missed warnings, local rationality and erosion of safety margins (Rossnes, 2001). 
5. Crisis handling decision happens when the decision maker face imminent threats. A 
typical problem may be unpleasant stress, psychological limitations and defective 
coping if danger materializes (Rossnes, 2001). 
2.3.3 The “Step ladder” Decision Model 
Models of decision making are proposals for how the internal processes of the decision 
making system are organized and structured, and account for how decisions are made. The 
empirical sequential “Step-ladder” model described by Rasmussen is the best known model. 
This model is the basis of the skill, rule, knowledge distinction which will be described later. 
The “Step- ladder” model identifies eight steps of decision making from activation to 
execution (Redmill and Rajan, 1997): 
1. Activation - Detection of need for data processing. 
2. Observation - Gathering of information and data. 
3. Identification - Naming the present state of the system. 
5. Interpretation - Considering the consequences for current task, safety, efficiency, etc. 
4. Evaluation - Evaluating the alternatives in relation to the chosen performance criteria. 
6. Goal Selection - Selecting the appropriate change of system conditions. 
7. Procedure selection - Planning the sequence of actions. 
8. Execution - Carrying out the planned actions and coordinating them. 
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Figure 29: The “Step-ladder” model of decision making (simplified) (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). 
Figure 29 shows the short cuts (transverse links between stages of decision making) that 
human decision makers take in real-life situations (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). There is no 
stage called decision or choice, but instead the decision is the outcome of a number of 
iterations between interpretation and evaluation. This model has been applied with some 
success by a number of researchers (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). One of the advantages of the 
“Step-ladder” model is that it specifies the correct and complete way to execute the procedure 
and it also accounts for the various ways in which shortcuts may be made (Hollnagel, 1984). 
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2.4 Work Performance 
To assess and improve the human performance, HTO and the HTO interactions in complex 
work settings, the knowledge of work performance can be used to create a work situation 
which actively contributes to a safe and efficient operation, taking into account opportunities, 
limitations and human needs. The understanding of work performance can thereby be used to 
assess and improve the human performance and HTO interactions. The work performance has 
to be better understood in the SWI context, to achieve an acceptable or close to optimal 
human performance. 
One must strive to optimize work performance, but this is challenging due to many 
unexpected factors influencing the work performance under different working conditions and 
operational settings. To understand what is meant by work performance, is the first step in 
making informed people decisions (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). Different performance 
influencing factors (PIFs) affect the work performance and the human ability to improve 
performance. Also, error causation paradigms can help to elaborate and improve work 
performance in complex work settings, with the advantage of contributing to a challenge 
evaluation and identification from different point of view. 
2.4.1 Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs)  
Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs)
 
can affect the human performance and the human 
abilities to perform actions in a safe and efficient manner.  Embrey (2000) defined PIFs as 
“those factors which determine the likelihood of error or effective human performance”. 
These factors are often the reason for human errors, and they may also affect the ability to 
improve and improvise work performance. Performance will be optimal and error likelihood 
will be minimized when PIFs relevant to a particular situation are optimal (Embrey, 2000).  
The understanding and knowledge about PIFs is critical to achieve the goals of safe and 
effective performance, and it gives valuable information, so specific measures can be done to 
reduce the negative effects on performance. The human sense organs eyes, ears, nose, taste 
and sensory receptors in the skin receive stimuli which are processed in the human brain, and 
may affect the performance.  
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PIFs can be classified as (ExproBase, 2008): 
 Workplace-related factors (routines, environment, equipment, layout, interaction 
personnel policy, economy) 
 Human-related factors (Personal - , Psychological - and Physiological - factors) 
Different researchers may tend to classify the factors differently, and figure 30 shows how 
Redmill (1997) views the PIFs.  
 
Figure 30: PIFs, work-related and human-related factors (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). 
Basic human error and PIFs are factors that together can create critical operational situations 
with serious consequences, but the error likelihood can be minimized and the work 
performance can be improved when PIFs are identified, classified and optimized. A lack of 
this identification is may contribute to human errors, poor decision making and reduced 
performance.  
2.4.2 The Paradigms of Human Error Causation  
Niccolo Machiavelli, an Italian historian, philosopher, humanist, and writer once wrote: 
“A common failing of mankind is to never to anticipate a storm when the sea is calm”  
Human error can be caused by various conditions, issues and sources in a given work setting. 
The human error causation paradigms presented in this section, were proposed by Redmill 
(1997) and are used to elaborate complex interactions and to get an instructive overview of 
the complex work settings. It can thereby contribute to be “prepared for a storm” or to 
implement measures to hinder such situations by spotting the critical influence factors that 
have a great potential to influence and contribute to safety and work performance risks. 
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The human error causation paradigms include the engineering error paradigm, the individual 
error paradigm, the cognitive error paradigm and the organizational paradigm (Redmill and 
Rajan, 1997). The paradigms are different from each other and evaluate challenges from 
different points of view. They identify and seek to answer what are the challenges and 
influencing factors in the given working situations and what can be done to improve the work 
setting. Figure 31 illustrates the four paradigms. In addition, I wish to present a work 
sociological paradigm I have put together and defined in the end of this section. 
 
Figure 31: The four error causation paradigms (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). 
The Engineering error paradigm  
The engineering error paradigm relates to the design, technical aspects of the system and the 
characteristics of the system. This paradigm looks at the human as an unreliable part or almost 
equivalent to hardware components in the system. Important aspects are the human-machine 
design, human-computer design and automation (Redmill and Rajan, 1997).  
Automation is performed to “engineer out” human failures and is often performed to reduce 
risk and cost, but it is important to remember that the automation can create new sources of 
reducing human reliability. Designing the man “out of the loop” through automation is often 
considered as a proposal for reducing risk, but the system designer may introduce errors into a 
system during the design process (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). Therefore, automation is not 
always proven to be cost-reducing and effective. Errors may for example occur when a non-
automated task have to be performed by an operator. Failures or errors in an automated 
process are considerably more complicated than in a manual process, therefore an important 
issue is related to risk and the recovery from failures.  
 
From a human-machine interaction view errors often occurs as a result of a human-machine 
mismatch between the demands of the task, the characteristics of the interface provided to 
enable the person to carry out the task and the physical capabilities of the person (Redmill and 
Rajan, 1997). This part of the engineering error concentrates on the individual and the 
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immediate work situation, which has a clear connection to the socio-technical working 
context and the human-machine interactions which is in direct contact with the operator. All 
attributes of an interactive system (displays, screens, controls, task aids, alarm management, 
panels and other hardware and software devices) that provide the information and controls 
necessary for the user to perform tasks is included in the term Human Machine Interface - HMI, 
illustrated in figure 32. Humans perceive information from technical systems or machines 
through the senses and relate it to previous experience, rules and procedures (cognition) 
before taking action. The actions are performed on the controls of a system like “press a 
button” or “pull the handle” and the technical system handles the input. The feedback from 
the machine is presented by displays. The engineering view promotes recognition solutions to 
human reliability through ergonomic design changes, improved training and procedures. 
There is also a clear focus on PIFs (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). 
 
       Figure 32: A simple Human Machine Interphase (HMI) model. 
The Individual error paradigm  
The individual error paradigm considers the personnel characteristics like attitude, safety 
attributions, motivational and personality issues. Even a very professional design may have 
the tendency to lead to errors in the presence of such personnel characteristics. The humans 
are very unpredictable because of their great diversity. This view relates to and presents that 
human errors occur because the person is “not trying hard enough” or “not paying sufficient 
attention to the task” (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). A person can make an error that is well 
known and well understood with tragic consequences. The motivation of the worker is often 
questioned by an investigator, and solutions to human error from this view are often related to 
disciplinary measures, such as suspension and dismissal. Human performing “corner cuttings” 
in work situations can be attributed to safety attitudes, beliefs, risk-taking behavior, conflict 
and motivation (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). 
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The Cognitive error paradigm  
The cognitive error paradigm focuses on the psychological attributes and information 
processing causes of human error, and it covers both skills and decision making errors and 
considers the capabilities and limitations of the individual human information processing 
system (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). The human errors are analyzed in relation to the abilities 
of information processing, the interaction with individual tasks and situations, and human 
error tendencies. Mismatches between mental and physical capabilities of people and the 
demand of the job performed are assumes to be the cause of the human errors. The cognitive 
paradigm consider error reduction to be dependent on the cognitive root causes of failure like 
attention failure, information overload, memory failure and decision making failures, but 
errors related to the “I don’t care” attitude, emotional state of mind and the mental state of 
humans may occur, resulting in lack of motivation, concentration, performance, and rules and 
regulations violations. Human errors related to the emotional state of mind, that is for 
example divorce or death in the family, can never be totally eliminated, but the person can be 
removed from critical work tasks until the situation has improved.
 
  
The Organizational error paradigm  
The organizational error paradigm has a broader perspective than the paradigms earlier 
presented, and relates to the managerial practices, the management decision making and 
issues such as safety culture, participation, competence, control, and communication (Redmill 
and Rajan, 1997). It assumes that human errors are caused by certain preconditions in the 
work context which can include aspects such as poorly designed procedures, unclear 
allocation of responsibilities, lack of knowledge or training, low morale, poor equipment 
design, and time pressure. These preconditions can be tracked back to management and 
organizational policies and decisions. Other general failure types and aspects which may 
cause unsafe acts and affect decision making are poor management decision making and 
planning, communication failures, poor safety management, inappropriate workload levels 
and lack of competence (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). 
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The Work sociological paradigm  
This thesis will also study challenges which may affect decision making and work 
performance from a work sociological perspective. This is a paradigm I have put together, 
with group dynamics and team work as the main elements, and I feel that adding such a 
paradigm can be useful to reach this thesis objectives. A work sociological paradigm 
considers the direction and implications of trends in group dynamics, team work, 
relationships, human cooperation, culture, and other employment relations in the work 
organization. In modern societies, changing trends may be related to changing patterns in 
work sociology. All spheres of human activity are affected by the interplay between the 
individual and social structure. The focus is on the influence of human relationships and how 
these relations affect attitude and behavioral patterns. The sociological elements may affect 
decision making and work performance if the elements are not satisfying.  
Group dynamics within teams of social groups refers to different systems of behaviors and 
psychological processes occurring within a group or between groups, also referred to as intra -
and intergroup dynamics. An understanding of such dynamics can be useful in understanding 
decision making and performance behavior. The humans may resist, challenge or contribute 
to the patterning of the work sociology and shaping of the work institutions. Psychosocial 
factors and provocations are rarely identified as the underlying cause for lack of human action 
at the work place (Bento, 2001). The result of this lack of identification is erroneous actions, 
and the real problem is not resolved. Team work is a way to get a group of people to achieve 
results and can lead to significant improvements in productivity and quality. It can also make 
basic changes in behavior, thinking and values both positively and negatively. Within a team 
there is a set of norms and roles together with relations and common goals. Some teams are 
developing positive partnerships and group dynamics, commitment and views, while others 
develop the opposite. A well-functioning team is task-and group-oriented, with mutual 
support and thus a positive cooperation, while a poorly functioning team may have internal 
competition, criticism, lack of confidence and uncertainty. Knowledge is the key to 
organizational performance (Mankin, Cohen and Bikson, 1996). Organizations will have to 
learn how to generate, organize, manage and apply knowledge and information more 
effectively to succeed in the fast-paced and intensely competitive global marketplace. Team 
work is essential for organizational effectiveness and success, while information is the key to 
effective team work (Mankin, Cohen and Bikson, 1996).   
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2.5 Human, Technology and Organization (HTO) 
SWI operations will be affected by the Human, Technology and Organization (HTO) 
elements. Knowledge and understanding of HTO and the HTO interactions is critical to 
achieve a safe and effective operation, decision making and work performance. The human 
performance model, PIFs and error causation paradigms presented above, can help to identify 
and solve challenges, and are all a part of the HTO perspective or “way of thinking”. This can 
contribute to better decision making and higher performance, safety, reliability and 
effectiveness.  
2.5.1 Application of HTO knowledge  
The application of HTO knowledge can provide clarity, increased understanding and 
awareness of the interplay between human, technological and organizational matters. It may 
contribute to reduce system vulnerability and to improve safety, performance and the decision 
making quality. The enabling of technologies and infrastructure to support complex 
operations draw attention to critical interactions and interfaces between human and 
organizational components of the systems (Vinnem and Liyanage, 2008). Technology has 
solved several problems in various communities by simplifying and streamlines our lives, but 
the technology also has its drawbacks and can lead to incidents and accidents. 
 "Technology ... is a queer thing. It brings you great gifts with one hand, and it stabs you in 
the back with the other" Charles Percy Snow, New York Times, 15 March 1971.    
(Britannica, 2012). 
The quotation points out that one can never predict the impact of the technology being put 
into use. The technology creates the potential, and the human-teams and organizations help 
the technology to fulfill that potential (Mankin, Cohen and Bikson, 1996). Therefore, also 
better knowledge of the interactions between the HTO elements is crucial in understanding 
the underlying causes of incidents and accidents in work processes and to achieve success in 
the preventive work (PSA, 2011). A situation can lead to big losses when human, technology, 
organization and work processes are combined and cause complex interactions. The 
interactions are illustrated in figure 33 and 34. 
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Figure 33: HTO - and Work Process interactions. 
Bridger (1995) wrote that by improving the interactions between human components, 
technical components and organizational components one can enable a work system to 
function better. This is a basic element in the HSE (Health, Safety and Environment) 
regulations in the petroleum activities (PSA, 2011). Efforts to improve the safety of systems 
have often, and some may say always, been hindsight dominated (Hollnagel, Woods and 
Leveson, 2006). The combination of HSE and HTO can, from my point of view, be defined as 
“hindsight in advance” where one can prevent incidents and achieve safe, effective and cost 
efficient operations by learning, studying, understanding and using the knowledge from 
previous experiences and mistakes.  
 
Figure 34: HTO and HTO interactions. 
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Figure 34 shows the importance of studying how changes in one HTO element can affect 
another. Modern complex work systems operate under much tighter constraints than their 
predecessors (Bridger, 1995). Systems become more complex and opaque to the people who 
manage and operate them (Reason, 1997). Modern work systems employ large numbers of 
specialists in fields such as industrial engineering, work study, personnel management, 
operations research and ergonomics. This introduces greater demands for coordination of 
large numbers of people and machines. Humans have also become increasingly remote, both 
physically and intellectually, from the systems in which they control (Reason, 1997). The 
petroleum industry comprises a growing number of Integrated Operation (IO), based on 
information and communication technology (ICT) advances (PSA, 2011). IOs means changes 
to organization, staffing, management systems and technology and its interaction. Statoil 
defined IO as: 
“Collaboration across disciplines, companies, organizational and geographical boundaries 
made by possible real-time data and new work processes in order to reach safer and better 
decisions faster” (Roland, Yttredal and Moldskred, 2008) 
ICT enables real-time data transfer and thus the basis for the decision surface found 
anywhere. Decisions can therefore also be done everywhere. There must be clear-cut ways of 
reporting problems, and it must be present for everyone for the simple reason that a problem 
that stays with whoever discovers it, is a problem that remains unknown (Hollnagel, Woods 
and Leveson, 2006). IO may lead to new technological opportunities and changes in 
responsibilities and roles related to the transfer of decision making authority. It can also cause 
more complex systems with confusions, uncertainty and work overload.  
The socio-technical system on which modern society is based, tend to increase the system 
complexity. This has an unavoidable consequence, namely that the interactions and 
dependency between the individual systems increase, and thereby the systems become more 
closely coupled (Hollnagel, 2004). The tighter couplings leads to those systems become more 
difficult to use, in terms of maintenance, operation, monitoring, management and control 
(Hollnagel, 2004). In a complex setting, harmony between the human, technological and 
organizational elements of operational settings is extremely critical for exposure of 
operational risk. Table 2 describes some components and situations concerning the human, 
technology and organizational elements which must be handled during complex operations. 
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Table 2: Describes components and situations concerning the human, technology and organizational 
elements. 
The Human element The Technology element The Organization element 
 Competency and 
education 
 Abilities, experience 
and learning 
 Planning 
 Manning and training 
 Communication and 
cooperation 
 Physiology, Psychology 
and sociology 
 Time and human 
limitations  
 Human needs and 
responsibility 
 Operational work tasks 
 Decision making 
 Work Performance 
 Complex work tasks 
 Stress and workload 
 Data interpretation 
 Too much or too little 
information 
 Attention 
 Personality and 
motivation 
 Behavior during 
operations 
 Alertness 
 Ability to perceive 
abnormal conditions 
 Cognitive workload and 
demands 
 Fatigue 
 Memory and attention 
 Attitude to safety 
 Etc. 
 Design of the system 
 Limitations due to the 
design 
 How the technical 
element supports the 
operators to perform 
their work safe and 
effectively 
 Degree of automation 
 Functionality 
 Usability 
 Integration 
 Operational tasks 
 Noise, vibration and 
temperature level 
 Compatibility of user-
technology interface 
 Functional 
characteristics of 
control panels 
 False alarms 
 Design faults 
 Technical error 
 Clarity of signals and 
user-friendliness 
 Work space  
 Compatibility and 
reliability of displays 
and controls 
 New technology and 
equipment 
 Location 
 Etc. 
 Responsibility, roles 
and management 
 Procedures 
 Communication 
 Competency 
 Organizational manning 
 Resource availability 
 Training programs 
 Planning and routines 
 Culture and structure 
 Framework 
 Power relations and 
 Cooperation 
 Decision making 
 Work Performance 
 Handover 
documentation 
 Standardization 
 Contractual issues 
 Psychosocial working 
conditions 
 Working environment 
 Sharing of experience 
 Control of environment 
 Team structure 
 Decision support 
systems  
 Physical working 
conditions 
 Conflicts 
 Work instructions  
 Time constraints 
 Interaction with other 
tasks 
 Etc. 
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HTO knowledge application can create a better understanding of the interactions between the 
elements, and it can provide a greater overview of the modern complex work systems. This 
perspective gives valuable information to do specific measures to reduce the risk and the 
negative effects when performing complex operations. A lack of identification and 
classification of HTO limitations, together with PIFs studies, may lead to human errors and 
reduced work performance. It illustrates the importance and advantages of a proper 
knowledge of complex work settings from an HTO perspective and that an overall 
understanding of the capabilities, interactions and PIFs is critical to achieve the organizational 
goals, and a safe and effective operation.  
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2.5.2 Human Factors (HF) 
Human factors (HF) are a part of the human element in the HTO context, and have over the 
last few years gained great attention in the petroleum sector in Norway. Legend has it that 
circa 450 BC Confucius, a Chinese community activist and philosopher, uttered the following 
dictum: 
 
“Tell me, and I will forget. Show me, and I may remember. Involve me, and I will 
understand” (From Chambers, 2005). 
 
The quotation shows the importance of involving humans in the situation to achieve skills 
through learning, which is the process by which humans acquire knowledge. A better 
understanding of HF provides a basis for preventing what causes human errors. The human 
factor plays a major role in causing and preventing accidents, since people design, manage, 
operate, maintain and defend hazardous technologies (Reason, 1997). HF also influences 
work performance and must be accounted for during design of systems and workplaces. 
There are many definitions of HF. PSA (2011) describes the HF technical area as a systematic 
analytic tool which includes methods and knowledge that can be used to improve, evaluate 
and assess the HTO interactions. The focus is on the human beings and their interactions with 
tools, machines, procedures, environments and workplace. Humans are both assets and 
liabilities in these different settings. According to Wong (2002) engineering, maintenance and 
operations are human interfaces to be considered. HF includes environmental conditions, 
workplace layout, and cognitive demands of interface design. Chapanis’ (1996) HF definition 
is as follows: 
 
“Human factors are a body of information about human abilities, human limitations, and 
human characteristics that are relevant to design” (Chapanis, 1996). 
 
The International Ergonomics Association (2000) has a more recent definition of HF: 
“Ergonomics (or human factors) is the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding 
of the interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that 
applies theoretical principles, data and methods to design in order to optimize human well 
being and overall system performance. Practitioners of ergonomics, ergonomists, contribute 
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to the planning, design and evaluation of tasks, jobs, products, organizations, environments 
and systems in order to make them compatible with the needs, abilities and limitations of 
people.” (International Ergonomics Association, 2000)  
HF objective is to minimize human errors and the effects of human errors and maximize the 
safety and effectiveness of human performance by making it hard to do things wrong and easy 
to do things right. Chapanis (1996) suggests that HF and ergonomics could be used equally. 
According to Bridger (1995) HF and ergonomics have always had much in common but their 
development has moved along somewhat different lines. HF puts much emphasis on the 
integration of the human considerations into the total design process, while ergonomics 
sometimes is more piecemeal and has traditionally been more tied to its basic science or to a 
particular topic or application area. The concept of ergonomics has been involved in the 
improvement of quality of life since the beginning of human era. Ergonomics studies have 
become more academic, accurate and concrete since the World War 2 (Bridger, 1995). The 
guiding philosophy of ergonomics is known as “Fitting the Job to the Man” (FJM). Both HF 
and ergonomics take the FJM approach and state that jobs should be made appropriate for 
people rather than the other way around (“Fitting the Man to the Job” (FMJ)). It has become 
clear that FJM is almost always superior approach to the design, and also during operations, 
of work systems (Bridger, 1995).  
A number of serious incidents and accidents have highlighted failures in HTO- and HF 
aspects which are important to achieve a safe operation and high performance. Barriers are a 
central concept to describe the preventive elements to prevent an accident from occurring 
and to reduce the impact (PSA, 2011). A barrier consists of one or more barrier elements, and 
the element can be of different types; for example technical, operational, organizational or 
human components. All the defensive layers would in an ideal world be intact and not allow 
any penetration by possible accident trajectories (Reason, 1997). Latent errors in the work 
tasks and environments can be “moldering” under the surface without causing damage 
(Wenner and Drury, 1997). “Holes” in the security barriers will lead to that error can 
pass through the Reasons “Swiss cheese model” in figure 35.  
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The “Swiss cheese model” is a good illustration of how different defensive layers, i.e. human, 
organizational and technical barriers, under a given set of conditions, can lead to hazards and 
potential human, economical or material losses. Poor senior management decisions and local 
workplace problems such as poor training or unsafe acts can be considered as “holes” leading 
to breach of the organizational defenses, barriers and safeguards leading to incidents, 
accidents or catastrophic events. 
 
 
Figure 35: Reason’s “Swiss cheese model”, where "cheese slices" illustrates barriers (nft, 2010) 
The HF knowledge can contribute to improve the elements people use and the environment in 
which they use these elements and thereby better match their capabilities, limitations and 
needs. It can also improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity of systems and work 
environments.   
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2.5.3 The SRK-Framework  
The Skill, Rule and Knowledge-based (SRK) framework is a good conceptual and structured 
framework that can be used for integration of workstation, job and organizational design in 
complex socio-technical systems, and can thus contribute to suggest improvement 
opportunities to identified challenges. The SRK-model was developed by Rasmussen (1983), 
and is an innovative approach to create a flexible and adaptive organizational design. The 
SKR-framework consists of three behavioral levels of cognitive control which are related to a 
decreasing familiarity with task and environment (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). First, the terms 
workstation, job and organizational will be presented, followed by an elaboration of the SRK-
framework. 
Workstation, job and organizational design  
Complex technological systems brings with it new demands and needs of human operations in 
the workstation design. The role of the operator has changed from manual to modern complex 
human-machine systems that constantly require that the operators must adapt to new systems 
and requirements with the risk of unforeseen events.  Lack of understanding of changing 
conditions in the system is synonymous with lack of knowledge about the system (Meshkati, 
1990). New information technology in workstation design can cause problems in the human 
reaction-time at the various hierarchical levels, and “information overload" challenges.  
The key factor to a successful job design is the identification of tasks and understanding of the 
specified conditions and performance requirements (Meshkati, 1990). The main job of the 
operators is to adapt to the changing requirements and operating conditions. To achieve a 
successful operation, it must easily be switched between different levels of cognitive control, 
but most task analysis and job design methods do not facilitate this, which is a challenge. 
If organizational design prevents the employees to respond to unknown events correctly, this 
will cause problems. Organizations may have limited capacity to process information, and 
they also have limitations when it comes to adopting different organizational designs to cope 
with increased task uncertainty. The available communication channels can be overloaded and 
this may lead to delays, distortion and less performance. In the centralized design structure the 
information must be brought up through the hierarchy through more or less overloaded 
information channels. The decentralized design structure enables decisions to be taken by 
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employees down in the organizational structure but with inadequate training and commitment, 
inappropriate behavior and incorrect decisions can be the result (Meshkati, 1990). 
Three behavioral levels of cognitive control 
Skill-based behavior refers to sensory-motor performance which takes place without 
conscious control. Routine and highly-practiced tasks are carried out in a highly automatic 
fashion with occasional conscious checks on progress (Reason, 1997). The person may be 
unable to describe how they control and on what information they bases the performance 
through the highly integrated smooth automated patterns of behavior (Redmill and Rajan, 
1997). At the skill-based level the information from the environment is perchieved as signals. 
Here, slips and lapses are types of errors that may occur when a skilled person are performing 
a familiar task. 
Rule-based behavior refers to a composition of sequence of subroutines in a familiar work 
situation and is typically consciously controlled by a set of memorized or written rules or 
procedures (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). The rules which are used can be reported by the 
human. One operate automatically and matching the problem to stored knowledge, and may 
then use conscious thinking to verify if the situation is appropriate (Reason, 1997). Typically, 
at the rule-based level the information is perceived as signs. The tendency to use familiar 
solutions even when these are not the most convenient or efficient, are general types of errors 
that occur at this level of behavior. 
Knowledge-based behavior represents when a person is faced with an unfamiliar situation, or 
an environment for which no know-how or rules for control are available from previous 
experience. This level is something we come to very reluctantly (Reason, 1997). At the 
knowledge-based level the information must be perceived as symbols. Performance is 
controlled at this level, which is the highest conceptual level, and misdiagnosis and 
miscalculations are mistakes occurring at this level of behavior (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). 
Using analogies or reasoning from first principles rather than employing existing rules from 
action, are typically involved in planning or problem solving. 
Application of the SRK-framework 
During times of unexpected change and in unfamiliar situations, the SRK-framework can 
provide a natural transition from “skill” to “rule” to “knowledge” based decision making to 
respond and adapt to changes in a safe and efficient manner.  Information is gathered from the 
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interfaces at the workstation site, and are analyzed according to the humans stipulated 
descriptions at the job level. It is then passed through organizational communication network 
according to the organizational structure to the appropriate team members responsible for 
decision making (Meshkati, 1990). The SRK-framework help to increase the capacity to 
process information adapt workstation design to people, improve response time and prevent 
information "overload". It can help the operators, designers and managers to determine the 
optimal mix between centralization and decentralization, and they can adapt job designs to the 
changing requirements and operating conditions. The framework can also contribute to 
integrate and coordinate organizational design, system safety and human factors, and enabling 
in the organization and optimization of the design. 
The SRK-framework shows the main distinctions between three levels of human performance 
(Reason, 1997). These performance levels are distinguished by psychological and situational 
variables that together define an “activity space” where the three performance levels can be 
mapped (Reason, 1997). The performance levels can coexist at the same time. Figure 36 show 
that humans can control their actions through various combinations of two control modes - 
conscious (paying attention to something) and automatic (largely unconscious) (Reason, 
1997). It also illustrates the second dimension defining the “activity space” of the situation, 
where the two extremes are highly familiar everyday situations and routines, and entirely 
novel problems.  
 
Figure 36: Location of the three performance levels within the “activity space” defined by control modes 
and situation (Reason, 1997). 
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According to Meshkati (1990), it exist so-called “design induced error” that operators are 
forced to deal with. Using the SRK-framework can help managers and designers to make 
better decisions in terms of workstation, job and organizational design to prevent "design-
induced errors”.  To obtain an optimal design that can prevent human error, this framework is 
a valuable means to improve the existing human automation involvement, and it offers a 
systematic and useful approach to perform analysis, choose levels of automation, control 
advanced control systems, and to choose the type of automation (Lin, Yenn and Yang, 2010).  
2.5.4 The importance of the What, How and Why questions  
There exist several different classifications of human error by using knowledge of human 
cognitive behavior. Most classifications have multiple levels of analysis, such as what 
happened, how it happened and why did it happened. Asking these questions is a way to 
classify human error, and can be a tool for practical application of acquired knowledge and to 
increase competence. This classification was used as a basis when making the interview guide 
for the collection of the results, given in Appendix 1. There are three categories of taxonomy 
that can help to study and analyze the nature and extent of human error (Redmill and Rajan, 
1997): 
1) Phenomenological taxonomy (What happened?) describes the error in superficial terms that 
refer to observable events, and are widely used in human reliability assessments. 
Substitutions, repetitions and omissions are typical categories. 
2) Cognitive mechanism taxonomies (How did it happen?) classify errors in the stages of 
human information processing, and are increasingly used in post-accident investigations. 
Memory lapses, misinterpretation, mistake alternatives, attention errors and perceptual errors 
are such examples. 
3) Taxonomies for bias and deep-rooted tendencies (Why did it happen?) that error is believed 
to reveal, and currently tends to be research tools. The classification at this level of the 
performance error-shaping factors can be done by using Skill- Rule and Knowledge based 
behavior theory. 
By asking "What", "How" and "Why" questions, one can learn from, analyze and study 
human error and accidents that have occurred in complex work systems. Thereby, one could 
improve the performance, procedures, rules, procedures, reliability and behavior. One can 
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eliminate, reduce and control the errors in situations that are safety critical. The questions can 
also provide input to a human reliability analysis and can be used for post-accident 
investigations and research (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). This gives the opportunity to improve 
the technical system design and operations, and provide input to risk and safety 
analysis. Organizational design, management and planning can also apply this knowledge 
(Redmill and Rajan, 1997). This shows a wide range of factors that can utilize the results from 
the "What", "How" and "Why" questions for improvement, learning, control and increased 
security. The importance of these questions addresses how the use of knowledge will 
contribute to a safe and improved performance and operation of complex work systems where 
humans are involved. 
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3. Results and Analysis 
This thesis shows that there are different ways of looking at the factors affecting the decision 
making and work performance situation at the SWI vessels performing complex operations 
(the human performance model, the error causation paradigms and PIFs). It shows that these 
methods can be useful to identify, evaluate and analyze work related challenges. They are one 
way to reach this thesis’ objective, and contribute in the conduction of the project tasks. This 
chapter will present the identified RLWI- and AX-S concept challenges within the given 
scope of the thesis, as mentioned earlier in project task number one. This is achieved through 
well prepared interviews with personnel from the companies which supply the SWI 
technology, in this case Island Offshore Subsea (IOS), FMC Technologies, Aker Well Service 
(AWS), Statoil and Expro. This was presented as project task number three.  
First, a short presentation of the interviewed personnel will be given but before presenting 
these results, I wish to point out some of the challenges I experienced while writing this 
thesis. There were some time and resource limitations when collecting the information and 
results. It was a difficult process reaching the correct personnel to be able to conduct the 
interviews, but the right people were reached in the end. Also, I want to emphasize that the 
intention of this thesis is not to identify and study technological- and operational based, and 
pure organizational based challenges and solutions. This thesis studies and proposes solutions 
to challenges from a human perspective, and critical factors potentially contributing to human 
errors. The thesis touches the organizational element through the PIFs and error causation 
paradigms, but the human element is the main focus. There are also some limitations in the 
AX-S results, due to the fact that the concept is not yet commercialized. I also want to 
mention that I am not a professional and that I am “new to the game” as a student. 
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3.1 RLWI 
3.1.1 Personnel Interviewed 
Representatives from the companies FMC Technologies, Island Offshore Subsea (IOS), Aker 
Well Service (AWS) and Statoil (client) have been interviewed to map the challenges that 
may affect decision making and work performance when operating RLWI. This thesis mainly 
focuses on the personnel located in the Tower Control and operational rooms at the Island 
Constructor. Therefore, personnel from these parts of the vessel were interviewed and the 
results are based at these answers. In addition some experiences and challenges from the 
Island Wellserver and the Island Frontier were covered. Also, many of the interviewed 
personnel from the Island Constructor had been employees at the Island Frontier for several 
years since this vessel is an older vessel, produced in 2004. Table 3 presents the personnel and 
positions which were interviewed. 
Table 3: The following hierarchical positions were interviewed at the Island Constructor, in addition to 
some positions at the Island Wellserver and the Island Frontier. 
Vessel Position Company 
Island Constructor Operations Manager Statoil 
Operations Manager Island Offshore Subsea 
Well Intervention 
Superintendent (WIS) 
Island Offshore Subsea 
Well Manager Statoil 
WOCS Operator FMC Technologies 
Tower Operator Island Offshore Subsea 
Wireline Operator Aker Well Service 
Island Wellserver Well Superintendent  Statoil  
Supervisor FMC Technologies 
Island Frontier Operations Manager FMC Technologies 
3.1.2 Error causation paradigms - RLWI operations 
One way to identify the challenges that can affect decision making and work performance at 
the RLWI vessel are the error causation paradigms, presented in the project task number four 
and five. The human performance model is used as a basis when identifying the challenges. 
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The paradigms identify and seek to answer what are the challenges and influencing factors in 
the given working situations and thereby contribute to achieve the objectives of this thesis. 
The paradigms are classified into the engineering, individual, cognitive, organizational and 
work sociological paradigm. The error causation paradigms are used to get an instructive 
overview of the complex work settings and to elaborate complex interactions (Redmill, 1997).  
Presentation of the identified challenges based on the error causation paradigms 
First, the challenges identified will be presented shortly through the error causation paradigms 
in table 4 to provide an overview. Second, using the same paradigms the challenges will be 
described in a short presentation, and a more detailed description of the individual challenges 
will be given later in the chapter when presenting the PIFs for the RLWI concept. 
Table 4: Presenting the identified RLWI challenges shortly, through the error causation paradigms. 
RLWI Error causation paradigms 
Engineering Individual Cognitive Organizational Work Sociological 
Identified 
Challenges 
- Large amounts 
of information 
- Complex GUI 
and HMI system  
- Tower Control 
design 
challenges 
(space, noise 
and vision) 
- Demotivation, 
frustration and 
less “alertness” 
due to periods 
with a lot of 
waiting 
- “Corner 
cuttings” 
- Complex 
information 
processing 
- The correct 
amount of 
information is 
not presented to 
the managers 
and operators 
- “Information 
overload” 
- Routine and 
sedentary work 
tasks 
-Lack of 
operational 
training among 
managers 
- Too little 
sharing of 
experience 
- Difficult to reach 
the right resources 
- Too many 
procedures which 
causes coordination 
challenges 
- Slow procedural 
updating system 
- Communication and 
information transfer 
challenges 
- Poor planning 
-Split up management 
and complex 
management 
practices 
- Unclear “command 
lines” 
- Need for clearer 
defined operator 
responsibilities 
- Many additional 
personnel board the 
vessel during 
mobilization, 
operation and 
demobilization 
causing uncertainties 
and confusions 
- Several shifts do 
things differently 
with lack of task 
standardization 
 
Incorporating a Human Perspective into Subsea Well Intervention (SWI)  
Decision Making and Work Performance at SWI vessels 
60 
 
The engineering error causation paradigm covers the personnel challenges related to large 
amount of information to handle and also challenges related to the automated part of the 
system. Information from the automated part of the system is presented to the operators at the 
monitors, and is continuously being updated during RLWI operations. The operators also 
receive information through radio, telephone, cameras and visually by looking at the 
operations performed on deck. This leads to large amounts of information to be processed 
during periods with high workload. Challenges were identified due to the automation 
complexity with too many alarms and too many “nice to know” alarms. It could sometimes be 
difficult for the operator to locate the error during work activity. The GUI (Graphical User 
Interface) - and HMI (Human Machine Interface) systems is complex with large amount of 
information to handle, coordinate, analyze and communicate, together with operation tasks 
and extensive use of various communication and monitoring devices. The Tower Control 
design challenges were also identified, with space, noise and vision ranked as the main 
context concerns. This will be further described when presenting the PIFs. 
 
The individual error causation paradigm considers the human’s motivation, attitude and 
“corner cuttings”. It appears to be a challenge keeping people motivated with a lot of waiting 
due to weather conditions, downtime, flawless periods and other causes. This may cause 
frustration, demotivation, less “alertness” and the feeling of being “left over”. Challenges 
concerning human body “resting modus” were also identified, and will be presented in the 
PIFs section. “Corner cuttings” attributed to motivational and attitude factors have happened.  
 
The cognitive error causation paradigm covers the information processing, mental and 
physical experience, training and sharing of experience. The survey identified some 
challenges for the managers and operators related the information processing and the amount 
of information provided in RLWI operations, and especially during hectic mobilization and 
demobilization. There is a lot of information and documentation to be processed during such 
periods leading to “information overload”. It may be difficult to identify what information is 
important for the activity within the given time frame. The operators and managers also 
receive information both visually, written, and through radio- and telephone. The personnel 
felt that the correct amount of information was not presented to the managers and operators. A 
mismatch between the mental and physical capabilities of personnel and the demand of the 
job performed for new personnel during work and training has happened, but is not frequent. 
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The operator monitoring tasks may be characterized by routine and is sedentary, and can 
easily lead to lack of focus. The personnel training was ranked as good, but according to the 
crew it was always room for improvements. The operators felt that the managers lacked 
operational training suitable for their increasingly complex work tasks and responsibility. The 
crew also felt a need for better sharing of experience and “lessons learned”. 
The organizational error causation paradigm considers the personnel competence level, 
procedures, communication and management. Today, it is difficult for the companies to 
provide sufficient personnel with adequate competence and experience due to the competitive 
market. Also, right resource availability during weekends, holidays, and even during the night 
can be challenging if operational difficulties occur and important decisions must be made. 
There are challenges related to the sheer number of comprehensive procedures, which causes 
coordination challenges. It was also presence of a slow procedural updating system. The 
survey identified challenges regarding communication and information transfer between the 
different companies, and between the different levels of competency and experience at the 
vessel, potentially leading to errors when combined with the comprehensiveness of the 
procedures and coordination challenges. The survey also identified limitations in the planning 
process during mobilization and demobilization. It was sometimes a mismatch between the 
plans being executed at the onshore facility and the corresponding action at the vessel. The 
management practices are complex and the challenges concerning a split up management due 
to the joint venture between Island Offshore, FMC and AWS, gray areas in the reporting path, 
unclear “command lines” and lack of standardization were identified, and will be further 
described later as PIFs. The operator’s responsibilities could also have been clearer defined. 
 
The work sociological error causation paradigm focuses on the team and group dynamics in 
this thesis. The team work and group dynamics during RLWI are very good, and all of the 
managers and operators reported a good working environment with a great culture. A team 
challenge mentioned by the crew is related to the challenges that occur when different 
companies provide people to the vessel during mobilization, operations and demobilization. 
The personnel are usually not the same between each boarding, causing uncertainties and 
confusions when it comes to who belongs to which company, and who is responsible for 
which tasks. Also, several shifts conduct tasks differently, which was defined as a challenge 
by some personnel who asked for a more standardized way of performing activities.  
Incorporating a Human Perspective into Subsea Well Intervention (SWI)  
Decision Making and Work Performance at SWI vessels 
62 
 
3.1.3 Identified Performance Influencing factors (PIFs) at the RLWI vessel 
PIFs are those factors which determine the likelihood of error or effective human performance 
(Ember, 2000). A wide range of PIFs are often the reason behind human errors and can 
contribute to incorrect decisions, reduced performance and critical operational situations if not 
handled correctly. The operational managers, Well Intervention Superintendent, Well 
Intervention Supervisor and operators at the vessels operate technical complex equipment, 
with continuously problem solving, analyzing, discussions and monitoring. They are 
performing complex tasks and are dependent of effective cooperation and team work to gain a 
safe and cost effective production, this combined with extensive use of monitoring programs 
and cameras, and communications through telephone and radio. This shows the importance of 
identifying the PIFs which in turn can contribute to identifying the challenges during such 
complex situations. These factors can increase the understanding, reduce human error and 
improve the decision making and the work performance. The PIFs method is, from my point 
of view, seen as the right way to reach the objectives in this thesis, and is presented as project 
task number six. The human performance model, with the human, activity and context 
components, was used as a basis when identifying the challenges. Figure 30 illustrated earlier 
in this thesis, showed how Redmill (1997) views the PIFs as Work-related factors and 
Human-related factors. This division will be used when presenting the PIFs.  
I: Work-related factors 
 
A: Environment 
Space and Ergonomics 
There is a lack of workspace at the vessels, especially in the Tower Control at the Island 
Constructor and the Island Wellserver since both managers, operators and service personnel 
are located in this part of the vessel, as described earlier. The Island Frontier is an older boat, 
also with a lack of space in the Tower Control, but fewer personnel are located here compared 
to the other two vessels. The Tower Control is small and it is difficult to provide workstations 
following today’s requirement, and the fact that there is too little space is a general challenge 
at all the vessels. The space around the operator’s chairs at the Island Constructor, especially 
the WOCS station, is not physically suited for holding and storing of the necessary paper-
procedures and to maintain a good overview. The operators must hold the procedures in their 
laps during operations due to the lack of space, and the space challenges also contribute to 
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cluttering. The personnel stated that there is room for improvements in this area to achieve a 
better work performance and decision making. According to the operators the ergonomically 
design of the desks and chairs are good, as the chairs are comfortable and adjustable.  
 
Noise 
The survey showed that the personnel at the Island Constructor and Island Wellserver are 
satisfied with the fact that the necessary personnel are gathered in the Tower Control since 
this improves the communication and shortens the information path. The surveys also showed 
that the operators in the Tower Control experienced problems with noise, due to the fact that 
it is sometimes very crowded with a lot of people coming and going causing distortion and 
noise. The Tower Control is a “gathering point” or “center at the deck” for discussions, 
conversations and questions. Some personnel must also visit the Tower Control to “sign in 
and out” to be able to access higher floors in the tower which also causes traffic and noise. 
The heavy doors are opening and closing, and cause disturbance. Signs are in place at the 
doors to remind people to take the situation in account before entering, but the noise challenge 
still persist. The tower operator is positioned in the middle, as shown earlier, and gets the 
noise from both sides. For some personnel this contributes to errors. Some felt that the tower 
operator should have had their own Tower Control arrangement, such as the one found at the 
Island Frontier. There is also cabinets and computer equipment placed in the Tower Control at 
the Island Contractor contributing to disturbing noise. The operators suggested that this could 
have been placed in another room. The air condition makes a disturbing noise, affecting some 
of the personnel, and a number of telephone calls are also disturbing for the personnel. 
 
The fact that there is much noise and disturbance in the Tower Control worries some of the 
operators at the Island Constructor when it comes to the risk, safety and performance. 
Unfortunately, noise may contribute to tiredness, fatigue and also stress, without the operator 
being fully aware of it. The noise in the Tower Control may cause decision making and work 
performance challenges due to the “visits”, presence or “walk through” from other personnel 
that might cause disturbance. At the Island Wellserver and Island Constructor the 
Schlumberger logging personnel are located in the Tower Control. The personnel at the Island 
Constructor informed that Schlumberger has conducted a study concluding with that they 
want to move to another room next to the operational room, and not be located in the Tower 
Control. 
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Vision 
The tower operator at the Island Constructor does not have an optimal view out the windows 
due to beams in the tower construction which limits the view. The wireline operator also 
experience vision challenges and has difficulties getting a good overview when monitoring 
the deck operations, due to small windows placed in a too high position compared to the 
operator chair, monitors and sticks. It was then difficult to monitor the screens, using the 
sticks and looking at the deck simultaneously because the operator had to switch between 
sitting and standing position to be able to look out of the window and get a proper overview. 
Sometimes a second person was needed during wireline operations to look out the window 
and inform the wireline operator of what was happening at the deck, while the wireline 
operator monitored the screen and steered the sticks to perform the operations.  
 
B: Displays and Controls 
Panels and Alarms 
There are many alarms at the panels, and at times too many. From some personnel’s point of 
view many alarms are “nice to know” alarms and are often unnecessary. Measures have been 
performed to remove redundant alarms, but it is difficult to assess the importance of the 
alarms. The many alarms did not give guidance to the actions the operator should take in the 
situation. According to some personnel monitoring programs and alarms might not function 
optimally in a given critical situation and in the end this may eventually influence the decision 
making and work performance.  
 
The WOCS operator has an important position where he/she controls the RLWI operation 
with keystrokes and one mistake may cause serious consequences. Therefore it is important to 
optimize the WOCS operators working conditions to reduce those types of risks. The WOCS 
control program is very complex, and it can be difficult to find the error if one occurs. It is a 
lack of a clear early alarm when something is abnormal to help the operator to prioritize the 
alarms in situations which may be critical. The indication on what is wrong may not be clear 
enough, and the WOCS operator can sometimes have difficulties discovering developing 
situations in the well/stack due to the large amount of information presented at the monitors 
together with “disturbing” factors “hiding” the developing situation. There may be 
uncertainties to where and when to focus the attention in the automated part of the system, 
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and this especially applies for new personnel. Long time personnel training are required. The 
survey showed that the panel’s functional characteristics, clarity of signals and user 
friendliness were ranked as acceptable, but there is room for improvements as those 
mentioned above. 
 
Complexity 
The challenge with the GUI- and HMI systems relates to the complexity and there have been 
situations where the “wrong” things have been done due to this. Factors that may challenge 
work performance when it comes to the degree of automation of work tasks are that the 
personnel may blindly follow the procedures, without understanding the whole complex 
“operational picture”. It is also difficult to maintain a complete overview of the procedures, 
monitors and the situation on deck, while communicating and contribute to decision making 
during hectically periods. It is important to have a good understanding of the whole situation, 
and not only the automation and procedural part, to achieve an optimal work performance and 
safe operation.  
 
C: Task demands 
Information and communication 
The managers and operators have reported some challenges related the amount of information 
provided to the personnel together with periodically high workload and time pressure. 
“Information overload” has happened, which have led to reduced work performance and poor 
decision making. The experienced operators feel that they can handle the large amounts of 
information to a certain extent, but new personnel may struggle with “information overload”. 
There is a lot of information provided to the personnel during RLWI operations, and it is a lot 
of documentation to keep track on. It can be difficult to go through all of the information and 
identify what is important or not. The personnel also have to deal with the individual 
companies’ operational procedures, and additional procedures. The Statoil program contains a 
lot of information, maybe too much.  
 
During RLWI mobilization and demobilization it is quite hectic. The information processing 
and communication is complex during these periods with information transfer between 
different levels.  
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Some felt that the amount of information presented to the managers and operators during 
RLWI operation was not optimal. There were also some communication and information 
handover challenges, where new information that occurred during the shift was not passed on 
to some of the crew or to the next shift. Information can thereby be “blocked” between 
boundaries, but this was not very frequent when important information occurred during a 
shift. One example of communication failures was when performing lift from the template to 
the vessel without closing in the neighboring well, this due to lack of communication between 
day and night shift and wrong risk assessment during the night shift according to the 
personnel. Errors have also occurred due to communication failure between the management 
and operators and because the procedures were not completely followed as they should. This 
led to a serious incident, but this is not frequent and it is zero tolerance for this at the vessel. 
 
The personnel normally work with the same team members within their working area during 
the shifts. It can be a challenge that many other companies provide different people to the 
vessel, and the people are usually not the same between each boarding. Many additional 
personnel increase the communication complexity. This can be service personnel and 
personnel boarding to perform tasks during mobilization and demobilization. Then it can be 
uncertainties of who belongs to which company, who is responsible for which tasks, who one 
can ask, and who is going to receive important information and pass it on. It takes time to get 
to know people which may be a challenge in such situations. 
 
Monitoring tasks 
Problems with too many unilateral tasks over a period of time may also be a challenge. The 
operators in the Tower Control have only a monitoring task, working 12 hours shifts monitor 
the screens and deck. It is great variations from one shift group to another for how long an 
operator sits in the Tower Control during one shift, and when somebody can “take over the 
helm” for the operator to take a break. Usually it is after 6 hours, but this varies. It lies in the 
human nature that it is easy to lose focus in such situations, and it has happened at the vessels. 
For example, the WOCS operator work with 12 hours surveillance, and depends on a 100% 
focus sitting in an environment with sometimes heavy traffic. The WOCS operator has an 
important key role and need a lot of training to be able to perform the tasks. A weak point is 
that few can perform the WOCS task if he/she needs a break or replacement. During lunch 
“WOCS II” step in, but is only trained to perform simple operations. In a crisis situation, the 
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WOCS operator on the opposite shift has to help. As mentioned earlier, the operators can 
easily become distracted and they are only a few keystrokes away from doing something that 
might be dangerous.  
 
Unfamiliar situations 
When unfamiliar situations occur, mistakes happen, but this is not frequent. In fact, challenge 
arises more often during known operations rather than unknown. Routines and little variations 
in the work tasks cause errors and the crew can unintentionally ignore known signals and 
signs. When unexpected situations occurred, the personnel sometimes had to “go around” 
procedures. Decisions have then been taken too quickly and consequences occurred. No one 
thought of the effect the action would cause. The personnel try to focus on people getting 
familiar when starting on duty, i.e. handovers, SJA and toolbox meetings.  
 
Mental and physical capabilities 
A mismatch between mental and physical capabilities of human and the demand of the job 
performed has sometimes happened among new personnel during training, but is not frequent. 
New personnel sometimes say that they know the task and can perform it, but it has happened 
that they cannot perform the task after all. The employees have had the wrong capabilities and 
competency. 
 
The system is very complex, extensive and difficult to operate without years of experience. 
The WOCS operator is a human barrier to the operation and this is a lot of responsibility with 
great competence requirements. Some mentioned that this might be too much responsibility if 
critical incidents occur in relation to what is expected from one person. Some were also afraid 
that the WOCS operator easily could become a target if a serious incident happens since 
he/she controls the operation with keystrokes, and is a human barrier.  
 
D: Instructions and procedures  
Coordination 
The RLWI procedures are accurate, clear, detailed and easy to use, but it still remains some 
changes to be made. Some felt that a relatively slow system led to that it took a too long time 
before the procedures got updated if some procedural changes had to be made. The survey 
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showed that the overall number of procedures is a challenge, rather than their contents. FMC 
has their detailed procedures, Statoil has their well program, and IOS has their project 
manuals. This cause coordination challenges of the procedures which can be demanding to 
keep track on. The personnel have to “jump” between different procedures during operation 
due to the number. There are also many additional procedures that must be implemented and 
coordinated at the appropriate time in the process. Also, the crew members were not satisfied 
with the number of forms, and they uttered that it often was an overlap between forms. 
Procedures or procedural steps have been skipped due to the high number of procedures. 
Some procedural tasks have also been duplicated, or some tasks have been differently 
described in different procedures. The procedures are necessary equipment, but operators 
have also experienced that three procedures told three different things, which confused the 
operator. There is then a risk of human errors, but the procedures are updated when wrong 
information is detected, though the updating system can be slow. When performing a “buddy 
check”, where you get a colleague to verify that you are doing things right after a task is 
performed, they have detected slips, and serious errors rarely occur due to this double 
checking.  
Violation of procedures 
Some personnel felt that the procedures, forms and the management documentation were too 
comprehensive, which gave rise to situations where some personnel took shortcuts, but such 
actions were seen very rarely. Despite this, a dangerous potential for making shortcuts or 
mistakes are present. Violations of procedures and “risk taking” behavior that challenges the 
decision making and work performance have happened due to communication failure and the 
number of procedures. It has happened that the procedure has not been complied with, or 
routine failure has led to operational errors, but this is very rare. In these cases, the human 
factors were present, including "absence" to a certain extent. It is common to have an internal 
investigation after such cases. Personnel have experienced pressure from different clients and 
personnel to skip steps in the procedures, or to do things in a different order. Mistakes have 
happened due to this. One operator said “my job is to do what I’m told”, but also says that it is 
important to be critical to the management/client decisions, take responsibility, and to think 
the situation through before taking action. 
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E: Socio-Technical 
Manning and competence 
The RLWI operation is very weather- and shutdown dependent, and some personnel 
mentioned that in such quiet periods it was almost too many people at the vessel, and they 
could go for days without having much to do. Also, when everything was going very well, it 
was generally little to do and they were therefore sometimes bored. The survey also showed 
that the availability of the correct personnel with the right competence may challenge or affect 
decision making. The personnel felt that the resource availability is currently low, due to a 
competitive market and lack of the right educated resources. Another challenge was the 
availability of resources located onshore during the weekends and holidays. It is then difficult 
to reach the right resources during important decision making. There is a great 
interdependence and when key personnel takes their weekends, holiday or even are at home 
sleeping through the night, it may be difficult to make the right decision. In such situation 
with a lack of key personnel, the employees at the vessel feel that they must be critical to the 
decision that returns from onshore and offshore facilities and focus on the importance of 
quality assuring the decision. 
 
The personnel training was ranked as good, but according to the crew it was always room for 
improvements. The personnel stated a need for a better sharing of experience and that the 
personnel where given a fair chance to familiarize themselves with positive and negative 
events that had occurred while they were at home. Also, sharing of “lessons learned” from 
previous operation could have contributed to save a lot of time and money in today’s 
operation, and could have contributed to a better and more streamlined decision making. The 
personnel will always learn as long as they go, and errors have occurred due to lack of know-
how, but they have avoided the big incidents.  
Planning and cooperation  
During the mobilization and demobilization phase there are many tasks to be performed, and 
it is sometimes an “anthill” at the deck and dock. The personnel felt that nobody holds the 
record of everything that happens and/or will happen. This may cause deviations from the 
plan due to both anticipated and unforeseen things. During mobilization and demobilization 
there is a problem with concurrent plans, and time pressure with a tight schedule may be a 
challenge if not handled professionally. They experience limitations in the planning to 
Incorporating a Human Perspective into Subsea Well Intervention (SWI)  
Decision Making and Work Performance at SWI vessels 
70 
 
achieve a continuous process. Due to poor planning and wrong decisions, performance 
degradation has occurred. Performance reduction has happened associated with large 
mobilizations where a lot of equipment is to be loaded of and on the vessel in the right place 
at the right time. Due to the limited space at the vessels deck, the placement of equipment 
must be well planned to hinder loss of time if the equipment has to be removed again to make 
space for other things. The personnel on board makes a good job when planning, but there 
may be some mismatch between the plans being performed by personnel located onshore in 
relation to what is done on board during mobilizations and demobilizations. The survey shows 
that the planners believe that they have planned for everything, but are hindered by entry and 
access limitations at the vessel due to too many simultaneous work tasks. This could have 
been better planned for. There are also tendencies to use plans or rules which have worked 
before during RLWI, but which may not be useful in the present situation. Side effect not 
considered when it comes to decision making during RLWI has happened when the team 
made an evaluation which was not well enough thought through. No one predicted the side 
effects which caused a potential for serious consequences. 
 
The survey showed that the group dynamics, relationships, cooperation and team work during 
RLWI are very good due to incorporation focus during the many years of operation. But to 
further improve the team cooperation, some of the personnel at Island Wellserver stated a 
desire to mix work tasks among the different companies (IOS, FMC and AWS), due to 
sometimes uneven work distribution and workload. This could increase efficiency and thereby 
contribute to save both time and money. They suggest that the three companies can perform 
tasks for each other which can streamline collaboration by erasing some invisible boundaries. 
The challenge is the alliance within these three companies. It may at times be difficult to get 
personnel from the different companies to perform work not within their own industry and 
company. The crew at Island Constructor stated the opposite, and told that the different 
companies in the alliance helped each other when somebody had little to do. They had a great 
focus on working as “one organization and one team”. This may indicate team- and 
cooperation culture differences. 
 
Some personnel mentioned that it should only have been one company on board as one 
organization, since it often is more difficult for several organizations to work as one. Another 
cooperation challenge is due to several different shifts doing things differently which can 
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contribute to losing both time and money. New ideas and explanations occur at different 
shifts. The personnel want more incorporation and standardization of how thing shall be 
performed to improve the cooperation. It is irritating to go through the same situation many 
times due to new shift arriving. Also, many clients have different demands, which can cause 
collaboration challenges between the alliance and the client when it comes to how things 
should be done. 
 
Management 
The management practices in the decision making processes during RLWI are complex where 
decision making often goes through the onshore facility. The survey showed that the 
managers felt that the allocation and distribution of responsibilities at the vessel was clear, but 
that is was room for improvements. They felt that the allocation was complex, but they knew 
whom to contact. Some might feel that they should have been informed and involved in a 
decision, and somebody felt that there was some gray areas in the reporting path knowing 
who should be involved and not. The management level could sometimes be ineffective 
because of the split up management level, due to the joint venture between IOS, FMC and 
AWS. Also, the marine part of Island Offshore is controlled from Ulsteinvik, and the 
operational part is controlled from Stavanger, causing even more split up management.  
 
The operators sometimes felt that the allocation of responsibility quality varied from which 
leader where in charge. Some leaders are very clear, while others are not, and some leaders 
“micro manages” the personnel, while others does not. The operators ask for a more clear, 
standardized and consequent management. They often experience to have four different 
supervisors during their two weeks offshore trip. This was annoying for some of the 
operators. One operator said that “We do not make many mistakes, but we use too much 
time”. The key to save time, from the operator point of view, is clearer “command lines”. 
Another challenge mentioned by the crew was too much swapping of crew constellations. 
This is organizational and management factors that can reduce or hinder the humans work 
performance. 
 
The operator’s responsibilities could also have been clearer defined, since the operators 
responsibility varies from one shift group to another and from one vessel to another. If an 
operator moves over to another shift group, he/she can get new areas of responsibilities, 
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although he/she has the same position as before, and works at the same vessel. The fact that 
the responsibilities are not standardized from shift to shift and from vessel to vessel can 
quickly make disturbances in the system when everybody does it “their way”. According to 
the personnel there should have been more dedicated responsibilities to the individuals 
onboard with clearer guidelines from the onshore organizations. 
  
Some personnel feel that some managers and supervisors are afraid of taking necessary 
decisions, thereby using an unnecessary amount of time. The survey also showed that the 
operators feel that the leaders do not listen to them when decisions are going to be made. 
They feel that the managers do not trust their decision and knowledge, and that the 
management maybe lacks the right knowledge to make effective, safe and correct operational 
decisions. One operator said that he sometimes felt that “the wrong man was hired in the 
wrong managerial position”. The leaders have very complex work tasks, and from the 
operator point of view, they need more operational training and courses to understand the 
“whole operational picture” when making decisions, and to increase their performance. Such 
training programs are not frequent for “experienced” managers.  
 
The long-term goals of the organization are mentioned by some personnel as a challenge. 
Long-term decisions are very difficult to make when the future is unknown. Personnel at the 
vessel felt that no one took the hold of this challenge, and thinks that the organization needed 
a decision on which direction they will choose in the future with other innovative and 
competing SWI concepts emerging with time. They felt that nobody uses resources on 
innovation and development in this area, or that “future thoughts” were not visible to the 
employees. 
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II: Human-related factors 
 
F: Individual 
Motivation and attitude 
The attitude and motivation among the personnel at the vessel are good, but it may be a 
challenge to keep people motivated with a lot of waiting due to weather conditions, 
downtime, and other causes. The personnel then have little to do, and for somebody it is 
frustrating and demotivating. Human failures, work performance reduction or unsatisfying 
decision making attributed to attitude and motivational causes has happened, but is not 
frequent. Automation combined with long periods of flawless operation or waiting due to bad 
weather conditions or shutdown might take the “edge” away from people, and they may be 
less on “alert”. Sometimes people feel “left over”. In such quiet periods a normal human body 
reaction is to put itself in a “resting modus”. When the work processes starts up again it is 
sometimes difficult for the person to instantly switch the body from “off” to “on”. Some 
personnel mentioned that their bodies could use hours to reconnect to fully active 
performance. This is a challenge, where the human body has to be switched “on” quickly. The 
survey showed that some personnel felt that the leaders must accept that this is a challenge, 
and that some “arrogant” leaders did not accept this fact.   
 
“Absentminded behavior” leading to slips of action or memory lapses during RLWI has also 
happened, but is very rare. The behavior has been caused by a combination of motivational 
causes, abnormal situation causes and mental causes. An “I don’t care” attitude, wrong 
emotional state of mind or mental state affecting decision making and work performance has 
also happened, but is very rare. Situations at home and sickness has caused this attitude. 
 
Slips, lapses and “corner cuttings” 
Slips and lapses types of errors occurring when a skilled person is performing a familiar task 
during RLWI has happened, but this is very rare. The personnel can make slips and lapses if it 
is too much routine work when performing their tasks. The person might do the familiar task 
without double-checking what he or she has done, or one can forget “buddy check”.  
 
There has been decision making and work performance “corner cuttings” attributed to safety 
attitudes, beliefs, risk-taking behavior, conflict or motivation, but this is very rare. “Corner 
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cuttings” can be done in agreement among the team, but can be poorly thought through.  
Misunderstandings, such as confusion of information have happened. This is a well-known 
challenge, but seldom due to good procedures and so-called “buddy check”. 
 
Issues like taking “familiar short-cut”, information not received, misinterpretation or 
assumption when it comes to decision making during RLWI has happened, for example 
during maintenance. Personnel may “check off” that maintenance has been done to 
equipment, although it has not, because the equipment has not been used since last 
maintenance check round. The person therefore makes his/her own assumption and checks it 
off in the forms, without discussing it with the rest of the team. This causes wrong historical 
data logging of the equipment. In different situations one can also choose a shortcut based on 
own experience, and can thereby make mistakes due to one trust itself too much. 
 
G: Stresses 
The survey showed stress levels among some crew members when it comes to information 
processing and performance during RLWI, but this is not seen as a challenge since the stress 
level was not rated as abnormally high by the personnel.  
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3.2 AX-S 
3.2.1 Personnel Interviewed 
Representatives from the company Expro working at the Havila Phoenix vessel have been 
interviewed to map the challenges that may affect decision making and work performance 
when operating AX-S. The interviewed personnel are listed in table 5. In addition, the results 
are also based on conversations with the Technical Manager which is responsible for sales 
and marketing. This thesis mainly focuses on the Deployment- and the Intervention Cabin and 
the personnel working there, but some studies are conducted of the Bridge where the shift 
supervisor has his/her workstation. The deployment- and intervention supervisors report to the 
shifts supervisor. 
Table 5: The following hierarchical positions were interviewed at the Havila Phoenix. 
Vessel Position Company 
Havila Phoenix Shifts Supervisor Expro 
Deployment Supervisor Expro 
Well Intervention Supervisor Expro 
 
3.2.2 Error causation paradigms - AX-S operations 
The five different paradigms look at the decision making and work performance challenges at 
the Havila Phoenix vessel from an engineering, cognitive, individual, organizational and work 
sociological point of view, presented as the project task four and five earlier in the thesis.  The 
human performance model is used as a basis when identifying the challenges. As mentioned 
earlier the paradigms identify what are the challenges and influencing factors in the given 
working situations and thereby contribute to achieve the objectives of this thesis. 
Presentation of the identified challenges based on the error causation paradigms 
First, the challenges identified through the error causation paradigms will be presented shortly 
in table 6 to provide an overview. Second, the challenges will be further described from the 
paradigms different points of view. A more detailed description of the challenges will be 
given later in the chapter when presenting the PIFs for the AX-S concept. 
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Table 6:  Presenting the identified AX-S challenges shortly, through the error causation paradigms. 
AX-S Error causation paradigms 
Engineering Individual Cognitive Organizational Work Sociological 
Identified 
Challenges 
- Large amounts 
of information 
- Operators still in 
the learning and 
familiarization 
phase 
- Automation 
system in the 
early stages, and 
relatively 
outdated 
computer system 
- Too much 
manual handling 
- Complex GUI 
and HMI systems  
- Deployment- 
and Intervention 
Cabin, and Bridge 
design challenges 
(space, noise, 
vision, air quality 
and lightning) 
-Demotivation, 
frustration and 
less “alertness” 
due to periods 
with a lot of 
waiting 
- Wide scope of 
work 
- “Corner 
cuttings” 
- Complex 
information 
processing 
- The correct 
amount of 
information is 
not presented to 
the managers 
and operators 
- Too much 
information is 
going back and 
forth. 
- Routine and 
sedentary/ 
stationary work 
tasks 
- “Information 
overload” 
 
 
- Do not have the 
right amount of 
correct personnel yet 
- Lack of resource 
availability 
- Not produced 
enough procedures 
yet 
- Communication and 
information transfer 
are not streamlined   
- Poor planning 
- Complex 
management 
practices 
- Allocation of 
responsibility is 
unclear for some of 
the personnel 
- Uncertainties as to 
individual 
responsibilities 
- Immature team still 
undergoing 
“storming” phase of 
the team dynamics 
- Complex team work 
tasks 
- New team 
-The relationships 
and group dynamics 
are not yet optimal  
 
 
  
 
 
The engineering error causation paradigm focuses on challenges related to the large amount 
of information when it comes to automated part of the system, and also Deployment- and 
Intervention Cabin, and Bridge design challenges. The totality with operation tasks, extensive 
use of procedures, documentation, telephones, radio, panels, and cameras makes the whole 
picture complex, especially for new personnel. The automated side of the system is in the 
early stages and is not operating to its full potential with a relatively outdated computer 
system according to some personnel, since it has been in development for some years now. 
The GUI- and HMI system is complex with a quite comprehensive computer system. It may 
be difficult for the humans to detect the reason behind an error alarm. The operators are still 
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in learning and familiarization phase, and the possibility for making mistakes when 
performing an activity is high since it is a brand new concept. Today, it is also a reasonable 
amount of manual handling required, which should be reduced in later stages from the 
operators point of view. Deployment- and Intervention Cabin, and Bridge design challenges 
were also identified, with space, noise, vision, air quality and lightning ranked as the main 
context concerns, described later when presenting the PIFs. 
The Individual error causation paradigm considers motivation, attitude and “corner cuttings” 
among the personnel at the Havila Phoenix. With an engineering project such as AX-S the 
personnel sometimes become frustrated and demotivated due to waiting, uncertainties and 
unknown areas. Personnel are required to work for longer periods offshore during the 
commissioning phase, resulting in a lack of motivation. Human failures with work 
performance reduction attributed to motivational causes have happened, due to the wide scope 
of work and amount of information personnel are currently dealing with together with 
repetitive work does which becomes mundane. “Corner cuttings” attributed to safety attitudes, 
conflict or motivation has happened, but is not frequent.  
This Cognitive error causation paradigm covers the information processing, mental and 
physical experience and training. The survey showed that the managers and operator 
sometimes had information processing challenges due to a large amount of information to 
handle, coordinate, analyze, and communicate. Some managers and operators feel that the 
amount of information presented to them is not optimal. Some mentioned that it feels like too 
much information is going back and forth and this could have been streamlined. There are 
tendencies of “information overload”, but this is most frequent among new personnel. There 
have been personnel that have lacked the technical ability required to perform activities that is 
so technologically advanced, showing a mismatch between mental and physical capabilities. 
The survey also identified challenges related to too many repetitive tasks and monitoring task 
for 12 hours. Doing this in standing position in the Deployment Cabin is tiring. The training 
program is too early to evaluate since the concept is in an early stage.  
The organizational error causation paradigm considers the personnel competence level, 
procedures, communication and management in this thesis. Due to the commercial phase, 
they do not have the right amount or the correct personnel yet. Also, the resource availability 
is not optimal, due to the fact that the AX-S is a new concept. The procedures are currently 
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still being developed and are being issued in “draft” format, and it is therefore too early to 
comment on the procedures other that it is not produced enough procedures at this time. The 
communication between the managers and operators is not streamlined yet. Poor planning and 
communication before or during AX-S operational testing has happened, and sometimes 
happens too often due to a combination of factors which will be presented later in the PIFs 
section. Organizational and management factors that may reduce or hinder the humans work 
performance may be politics, power struggles, perceptions of performance, attitude 
differences between contractors and staff, complexity, new operation, newly formed 
operational team and a new system. The allocation of responsibility is quite balanced and 
clear for some, while unclear for others. There is also an uncertainty as to individual 
responsibilities.  
The work sociological error causation paradigm focuses on the team and group dynamics at 
the Havila Phoenix. The teams have complex work tasks and they are new with unfamiliar 
structures. Right now the existing team structures are not ranked as optimal to execute safe 
and acceptable decision making and work performance. The group dynamics and team work 
are still at the “storming” phase. The team works very well together, but the relationships and 
cooperation is not yet optimal.  
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3.2.3 Identified Performance Influencing factors (PIFs) at the AX-S vessel 
As mentioned earlier, a wide range of PIFs can contribute to incorrect decisions, reduced 
work performance and critical operational situations, and an identification of PIFs can 
contribute to better the decision making and to improve the work performance. The 
supervisors, operators and other crew members at the Havila Phoenix operate technical 
complex equipment, with problem solving, team work, communication, discussions and 
monitoring as daily events during their shift. This shows the importance of identifying the 
PIFs since they can provide a better situational overview, understanding and knowledge. The 
way to reach the objectives in this thesis is to identify the PIFs, defined in the project tasks 
number six.  
I: Work-related factors 
 
A: Environment 
Space and Ergonomics 
The Deployment- and Intervention Cabin workplace arrangement is ranked fairly satisfactory 
by the crew, but with room for improvements. Some personnel felt that the cabins layout was 
fairly spacious with good placement of screens, chairs, desks, etc. Others felt that the cabins 
were small and that they could have been bigger since it is actually room for this at the deck 
when the cabins are placed on top of each other. When visiting the vessel I felt that the cabins 
were small, especially when several people were gathered in the cabin. The ROV Shacks was 
from the personnel’s point of view extremely well ergonomically designed. 
The ergonomic design of the Deployment Cabin could have been better. The stations are easy 
to use but they are better worked in standing position, which is tiring after 12 hours. Some 
personnel felt that the existing chairs have not been afforded the adequate amount of design. 
The chairs do not fit very well under the station and there is room for improvements here. As 
this system is the 1
st
 and is a prototype, there are lessons to be learned in this area, and they 
are working on improving the chairs. The ergonomically design of the Intervention Cabin is 
better, with a better adaption of the screens, desks and chairs, but it is also room for 
improvements here. 
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Noise 
The climate control adjustment in the Deployments- and Intervention Cabins is distracting 
and uncomfortable making loud whistling and humming noises. It is also much noise from the 
computer cooling system in the Deployment Cabin. The Deployment- and Intervention Cabin 
can be isolated in terms of distraction, and the doors can be shut to prevent outside influence 
from unauthorized personnel. There is considerable noise from one of the power conversion 
systems located in the Intervention Cabin. It is possible to shut the doors between the power 
distribution side and the monitoring side, but it is still noisy.  
Vision, lightning and air quality 
The Deployment Cabin where supposed to be positioned lower than it is today, and the cabin 
was actually designed for such low-level location. Due to the lack of space at the vessels 
deck, the Intervention Cabin had to be placed underneath the Deployment Cabin. This 
resulted in the high stationing of the Deployment Cabin. The cabins where supposed to be 
placed next to each other, but the company had to change their plans due to the fact that their 
original vessel never got produced. Therefore they chose the Havila Phoenix vessel, which 
was smaller, resulting in the rearranged placement of the cabins. Therefore the Deployment 
Cabin affords a limited view of the back deck area due to the fact the cabin was not designed 
for this. It is therefore difficult to look out the windows while monitoring the panels and touch 
the screens. There are cameras showing the deck area, but due to safety and efficiency it is 
important to be able to look out the windows while performing operational tasks and 
monitoring. The floors in the Deployment Cabin were actually raised for the operators to be 
able to look out the windows, but it is still difficult to get a good overview. A stool is placed 
by the panels which the operators can step on to. The design could hinder the performance by 
the location of the cabin or rather design of the cabin, but some personnel felt that this is 
overcome by a very good camera on the deck which provides CCTV (Closed-Circuit 
Television Camera) for almost everywhere on the back deck and tower. Despite the cameras, 
it would have been safer to be able to watch the entire deck while monitoring the screens and 
camera views, and not be fully dependent on the cameras. They can potentially fail during 
critical operations, and then it is important to have the opportunity to have an appropriate 
view out the windows. 
Some personnel located at the Bridge are bothered with bright lightning from the windows, 
blinding them when looking at the screens. This is tiring for 12 hours. Also, from my point of 
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view, when visiting the vessel it was dark in the Intervention Cabin, which had no windows. 
This cabin had no windows because no deck overview where needed for the personnel in the 
Intervention Cabin to perform their operations. A working desk in the middle of the 
monitoring stations had very little lightning possibilities at the time I visited the vessel. I was 
told that it was supposed to be dark in the cabin so that the operators were not tired when 
looking at the bright screens. Despite this I felt that it was too little lightning possibilities to 
achieve healthy working conditions, although I know that HES personnel recommend the use 
of low light in such environments.  
 
The climate control adjustment in the Deployments- and Intervention Cabins is limited 
causing bad air quality. When several people where located in the Intervention Cabin at the 
same time watching the screens during operations, the small square emergency door had to be 
opened to provide some fresh air, and to cool down the temperature.  
 
B: Displays and Controls 
Panels and Alarms 
The GUI- and HMI systems are complex, but ranked as relatively user friendly. The 
functional characteristics and clarity of signals is good, but it is room for improvements. 
Some mentioned that it was sometimes difficult to detect the error when something happened 
during operations. As the system is in early stages the automated side is not operating to its 
full potential. Some mentioned that the control cabins computer system hardware is relatively 
outdated as the system has been in development for some time. 
The relationship between automated and non-automated tasks in the cabins could have been 
better. Some personnel said that much of the system has been designed to reduce manual 
handling via automation, although presently there is still a reasonable amount of manual 
handling required. This should be reduced once the system becomes operational and best 
practices and procedures are developed, according to the personnel. 
 
The possibility of making mistakes is high as this is a brand new concept and personnel are 
learning and gaining experience. At present, it is sometimes uncertainties where and when to 
focus the attention in the automated part of the system, as the system is quite comprehensive 
and the operators of the system are still in a learning and familiarization phase. This also 
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applies to the high possibility that mistakes happen due to a person is faced with an 
environment for which no “know-how” or “rules for control” are available from previous 
experience. As the experience and knowledge of the system and enhanced procedures 
develop, this will most likely become less of an issue but although it is important to have a 
focus on this challenge. All activities are given full attention until they gain trust and 
confidence in the system, but even once this is gained every operation must be monitored.  
 
Complexity 
There is a diverse range of tasks to be performed both physical and mental, some tedious or 
repetitive others unique and requiring considerable thought and research. There are a lot of 
cross department interaction and assistance which provides additional diversity of tasks 
performed through the automated part of the system, contributing to increased complexity. 
 
The different personnel’s knowledge about the automated part of the system was ranked as 
low, and many operators do not understand the whole picture yet. It is still too early to be able 
to accurately quantify the human-machine match effectiveness of the system, though one 
would expect that once personnel are more experienced and the system optimized, it is likely 
to be a more functional and efficient system.  
 
C: Task demands 
Information and communication 
The right amount of information is not presented to the managers or to the operators in the 
cabins performing AX-S operations according to the personnel. Important information is 
communicated to the key-personnel through pre-shift supervisors meetings, shift task 
planning, priority meeting, shift handovers and toolbox talks, and by way of email, reports, 
procedures and training. There are sometimes tendencies of “information overload”, which 
have led to reduced human performance and poor/confusing decision making. As personnel 
have been on the project for a long period and through the build phase, information has been 
easy to take onboard as it has been put together bit by bit and information has been at a steady 
flow. Although for new personnel it is not easy, but this is understood and is the reason why 
personnel new to the project are put in the correct role and given the appropriate tasks for 
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their skill set and degree of knowledge. Still it is important to focus on the fact that the new 
personnel struggle with the information amount. 
 
The communication and cooperation between the managers are good, but there is room for 
improvements. The same applies to the cooperation between managers and operators, but it is 
ranked slightly lower. There are some team communication challenges between the 
Intervention Cabin personnel, Deployment Cabin personnel and the shift supervisor when the 
operations are performed. The processes are not fully streamlined yet. Some mentioned that it 
feels like too much information is going back and forth between too many reporting levels. 
According to the personnel, it would be better if the communication, command and reporting 
path were streamlined. When the shift supervisor communicates over the radio or telephone to 
the supervisors, located in the cabins, to perform an operational task with for example 
placement of subsea modules or stacks, the vessel may have moved its location during that 
time due to communication delay, hindering the correct placement of the stacks. Therefore the 
process takes time. To save time and to streamline the work processes, the shift supervisor 
delegates the responsibility to the cabin supervisors, and takes the responsibility back after the 
task is performed. Such measures could also help to streamline other communication paths in 
other situations too. 
 
Monitoring tasks 
Problems with too many repetitive tasks over a period of time may be a challenge. The 
operators in the Deployment- and Intervention Cabin have a monitoring task, and this also 
applies to the shift supervisor and DP personnel. They are working 12 hours shifts monitoring 
the screens and deck, and it lays in the human nature the risk of losing focus in such 
situations.  
Unfamiliar situations 
Memory lapses or attention errors due to human information processing issues of great 
amounts of information provided at the same time happens typically when dealing with 
unknown areas of the system and during operations of equipment. As the AX-S system, 
technology and concept is new and unique this is to be expected according to the personnel. 
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At present the possibility that mistakes may happen when a person is operating the automated 
part of the system and is faced with an unfamiliar situation during AX-S operations at the 
vessel is reasonably high as the system is in a pre-commercial commissioning phase, thus 
many of the operational situations are at present unfamiliar and untested. The system does 
have considerable safety interlocks to minimize potential mistakes.  
 
Mental and physical capabilities 
A mismatch between mental and physical capabilities of the human and the demand of the job 
performed has occurred. There have been personnel that have lacked the technical ability 
required to support a system that is so technologically advanced. 
 
The operators in the Deployment Cabin must be able to stand a lot during their 12 hours shift 
when monitoring the operations, which normally require both solid mental and physical 
capabilities. 
D: Instructions and procedures 
Coordination 
The procedures are currently still being developed and are being issued in “draft” format. 
They are being reviewed during first time conduct, and it is not produced enough procedures 
yet. The personnel knowledge about the content and requirements of the procedures are not 
satisfying at this time, and must and will be improved. The personal behavior of the teams 
with regards to procedures, rules and procedures seem to be proactive and openly accepted. 
Some mentioned that there is a concern that management will implement rules and safety 
requirement purely to satisfy clients rather than considering the practical benefits and aspects, 
though this is more a product of the industry sector than AX-S. 
 
E: Socio-Technical 
 
Manning and competence 
Due to the commercial phase, they do not have the right amount of personnel yet, and it is 
also difficult to find the right people with relevant experience to a new concept such as AX-S. 
Today, they have only two shifts, but they need more people with time. It is difficult to reach 
and hire the right personnel due to the fact that nobody has earlier experiences from such a 
concept to relate to. As they are yet to go commercial, the staffing levels are engineering 
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rather than operations focused, but this is said to change in the future. Some feel that the right 
skilled and experienced personnel are hired, while others feel that this is not completely true.  
Right now the training is not optimal due to the commercial phase, but at present it is too 
early to accurately comment on training, since training is planned in the near term. The 
sharing of experience is quite good, but it is always room for improvements. The working 
environment is sometimes characterized by openness an dialog, but not as much as it should 
be according to the personnel. 
 
Planning and cooperation 
Decisions errors or performance reduction due to poor planning and communication before or 
during AX-S operations testing has happened, and sometimes happens too often. This is the 
result of combination of factors according to the personnel; contractual complexities between 
Havila Phoenix/AX-S/Salt Subsea/Fugro, an immature team still undergoing a “storming” 
phase of the team dynamics, and a level of manning below that which is needed to effectively 
operate the AX-S system during full operations. Sometimes it may also be a problem with 
concurrent plans during AX-S operations and there is a tendency to use plans or rules which 
have worked before, but which may not be useful in the present situation.  
 
There are planning and cooperative challenges due to the new team and unfamiliar structures. 
The existing team structures are not ranked as optimal to execute safe and acceptable decision 
making and work performance. The work tasks of the teams are also quite complex. The 
dynamics of the team will change as they are new and still in the early stages of forming one 
team. The existing team works very well together with a great working environment and this 
has been proven when contingency plans have come into action, and they come up with ideas 
and solutions to overcome problems. Still, the relationships and cooperation is not optimal 
yet. They also solve problems and conflicts in a good manner and it is quite easy for the teams 
to share the same situation awareness during operations, but it is room for improvements. The 
personnel normally work with the same team members, and they work with almost all due to 
split shift pattern. There are currently only two crews, and changes are only due to agency 
personnel brought in to cover.  
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Management 
Organizational and management factors that may reduce or hinder the work performance may 
be politics, power struggles and perceptions of performance and attitude differences between 
contractors and staff. The managers work tasks are quite complex. There are challenges 
associated with the management practices and decision making related to a new operation, 
newly formed operational team and a new system. There have been many recent and ongoing 
improvements to find the most efficient and effective system for the team. There are 
challenges on the daily basis with this being a brand new design and engineering concept, and 
as the system is a prototype everyone has to work very hard to overcome problems. The 
allocation of responsibility is quite balanced and clear for some, while unclear for others. 
There is an uncertainty within certain team members as to individual responsibilities. The 
management structure has been modified several times to improve operations and due to 
changes to the company. One of the challenges is ensuring that personnel understand and use 
the correct chain of command, this to ensure that coherent, clear and consistent decisions can 
be made. The organizational diagram is not yet finished and the allocation is still in the early 
stages. There are areas that need changing. The allocation has been improved by the addition 
of an offshore project engineer between the shift supervisor and the operations manager in the 
hierarchy. Another allocation of responsibility can improve the decision making and make 
human performance more optimal, but others also feel that they have a fairly good system that 
will get optimized in as operations progress. This is organizational and management factors 
that may affect decision making and work performance 
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II: Human-related factors 
 
F: Individual 
Motivation and attitude 
The managers and operators work tasks are complex, and they have high demands of 
concentration and knowledge. The time pressure can also be high, followed by periodically 
high work load. Human failures, work performance reduction or unsatisfying decision making 
attributed to motivational causes has happened. With a unique engineering project such as this 
there are times where personnel become frustrated and/or demoralized, however there is a 
good team oriented work ethic. As there are no back to back crews with the system not being 
commercial and in the commissioning phase, a lot of personnel are required to work for 
longer periods offshore, this sometimes results in lack of enthusiasm and drive and ultimately 
leads to mistakes or bad decisions. Also, AX-S does not earn money yet, which can be 
demotivating for some personnel. An “I don’t care” attitude, wrong emotional state of mind or 
mental state affecting decision making and work performance has also happened, usually due 
to short term frustrations. “Absentminded behavior” leading to slips of action or memory has 
also happened, but is not frequent. 
 
Slips, lapses and “corner cuttings” 
Slips and lapses types of errors occurring when a skilled person are performing a familiar task 
happens, but is not frequent. This is attributed to the wide scope of work and amount of 
information personnel are currently dealing with, and repetitive work does become mundane. 
These types of errors have occurred during the mobilization phase with 24 hour work with 
multiple concurrent activities and a deadline to meet. It has also happened if there have been 
long period between operations i.e. the vessel has been alongside for a technical issue. It takes 
personnel a few shifts to get familiar again with operations. If individuals have a personal 
problem then this can also affect the concentration. This can also happen when a person 
thinks a task is below them and is not giving 100%, or if a task is repetitive. 
 
Decision making and work performance “corner cuttings” attributed to safety attitudes, 
beliefs, risk-taking behavior, conflict or motivation has happened, but is not frequent. The 
team has an open and proactive approach to safety. It is fairly common for them all to assist 
and remind each other when they forget “best practice”. This is why supervision is in place to 
Incorporating a Human Perspective into Subsea Well Intervention (SWI)  
Decision Making and Work Performance at SWI vessels 
88 
 
observe and to instruct correct/safe working practices. Issues like taking “familiar short-cut”, 
information not received, misinterpretation or assumption when it comes to decision making 
has happened, but very rarely. They take great care in ensuring everyone is aware of the job 
scope and not to go ahead and assume that what they are doing is correct. It has been a few 
occasions where personnel have done their own thing, but this was rectified. 
 
G: Stresses 
The stress level among the personnel when it comes to information processing and important 
decision making during operations is sometimes high, but is not ranked beyond what is 
normal in a commissioning phase.  
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4. Improvement Opportunities 
The identified challenges needs to be discussed related to opportunities to improve the 
working situations. The improvement opportunities, for the identified RLWI and AX-S 
challenges presented above, will be suggested with the SRK-framework as a basis in this 
section, but various solutions from other stand points will also be proposed. This is defined as 
the project task number seven. As mentioned earlier, the SKR-framework consists of three 
behavioral levels of cognitive control which are related to a decreasing familiarity with task 
and environment (Redmill and Rajan, 1997). Figure 36, presented earlier, will be used as 
background information for the solutions proposed in table 7. It illustrates that humans can 
control their actions through various combinations of two control modes - conscious and 
automatic (Reason, 1997). It also illustrates the second dimension where one has familiar 
everyday situations and routines, trained-for problems and entirely novel problems. The SRK-
framework is a good conceptual and structured framework which can be used to suggest 
solutions to the identified challenges and to increase the understanding, and are therefore, 
from my point of view the correct method to reach this thesis’ objectives. 
Some suggestions to solutions to the identified environmental and workplace design 
challenges presented above (space, ergonomics, noise, vision, lightning and air quality) will 
be presented when discussing these factors for both the RLWI- and AX-S concept in chapter 
5 “Discussion and Recommendations”. 
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4.1 Solutions from different perspectives  
The proposed solutions to the challenges will be presented in table 7. As mentioned earlier the 
SRK-framework is used as background, but solutions from other perspectives will also be 
suggested. 
Table 7: Proposed solutions, divided into common challenges between RLWI and AX-S concepts, and 
challenges the concepts experience individually. 
Identified 
Challenges 
Proposed 
Solutions 
Common Challenges  
 Large amounts of 
information to 
handle 
 
 Complex 
information 
processing 
 
 “Information 
overload” 
 
 Ineffective 
Communication 
and information 
transfer  
 
 
- Learn to handle the large amount of information and complex information 
processing through customized training to hinder “information overload” 
and increase the focus and awareness on this kind of issues through the 
training. 
- Communication and information transfer-based training can contribute to 
understanding and streamlining the processes. 
- Improve the procedures and rules with focus on decreasing/balance 
information amount to hinder mistakes, streamline communication and to 
make the processes more effective. 
- Hire the correct and right trained people able to think “out of the box” when 
novel situations occur and when there is a lot of information to handle with 
the need of effective communication. 
- Investing in more sophisticated information processing mechanisms. 
- Evaluate the existing organizational design and allocation of responsibility 
to see if it is adapted to the mentioned issues. To improve information 
processing and the ability to handle large amount of information, one can 
develop rules for a higher control of the organizational environment, 
utilization of more resources and create self-contained tasks through higher 
integration, or reduced division of labor. 
- Develop a team of operators or task force (and cut across the lines of 
authority) who can jointly resolve the outstanding and non-routine issues 
that might need higher levels of problem-solving and information processing 
abilities. 
- Make job aids such as a storage medium for keeping vital information 
available and easily accessible. This can be done by for example implement 
rules and routines for external information storage to be able to search and 
“go back” to critical information, to hinder loads of information in paper-
formats and to loose information. For example focus on storage of lessons 
learned to increase knowledge, understanding and effectiveness. 
- Focus on hindering selectivity, working memory overload and memory 
cueing. This can be achieved through training specific adapted activities. 
 Complex GUI and 
HMI system  
 
- Increase the operators knowledge and understanding through proper training 
- Focus on that the personnel have the correct mindset and availability to 
follow the procedures and rules, and that they are not too overconfident and 
oversimplify the challenges or tasks they face. 
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- Develop properly formatted job aids to the systems. This can reduce training 
time and enhance productivity, accuracy and effective work performance. 
- Use clear symbols in the interphase design which can help the operator to 
deal with the system’s complexity. 
- Focus on and provide high-level information GUI at the panels to enable 
accurate decision making and monitoring.  
- More extensive use of graphs instead of tables and other ways of presenting 
data. By clicking on the graph, the operator can reach more low level 
information and see the hundreds of alarms/statuses one by one if necessary, 
while the graph itself provides high-level information and an overview. 
- Use the operator’s knowledge and input when optimizing the GUI and HMI. 
 Routine and 
sedentary/ 
stationary work 
tasks 
 
- Hinder strong habit intrusions trough training and by increasing the 
awareness of the routine work tasks effects on the human. 
- Facilitate variation of work tasks, for example by standardizing how and 
when the operators can take a break or do some other work for a short 
period of time, this to “to break the routine pattern”. 
- Facilitating and improving the workplace to hinder errors due to routine and 
sedentary/stationary work tasks. 
- Increase the awareness of consequences of losing focus due to routine and 
sedentary/stationary work tasks. 
 Demotivation, 
frustration and 
less “alertness” 
due to periods 
with a lot of 
waiting 
 
- Performing training, operational activities, social activities, planning, team-
buildings etc. to keep people motivated, on “alert” and updated during such 
periods to hinder the body to “fall into a resting modus” with the danger of 
slips, lapses and human errors when the operation starts up again. 
- Perform procedural training. 
- Provide the possibility (maybe through a board) where the personnel can 
suggest general improvement opportunities and possible solutions to the 
challenges. It is important to use personnel knowledge and viewpoints. 
 Poor planning 
and concurrent 
plans 
 
- It is necessary to consciously formulate a goal and to develop a plan to 
achieve the goal. To better the planning process, training can be conducted 
to increase the ability to keep an overview. 
- Have a person or group of people that are interacting and keeping the record 
of everything that happens and will happen during operation, mobilizations 
or demobilizations, and that make sure that things are being performed 
according to the plan, hindering deviations from the intended plan and 
concurrent plans. 
- Develop rules, or improve existing rules to streamline planning and to 
hinder concurrent plans. 
- Implement proper planning problem solving abilities and increase the ability 
to use reasoning and using analogies when planning through courses. 
 Complex 
management 
practices 
 
- Increase and improve management training with focus on operational 
understanding and decision making.  
- Clearly define each leader’s individual responsibility, and focus on training 
within each area. 
- Standardize how managers shall control and define how the management 
processes can be standardized. 
 Uncertainties as 
to individual 
responsibilities 
 
- Clearly define each positions individual responsibility, and focus on training 
within each the area. Focus on how important it is that each and everyone 
know their own responsibility. 
- Make rules for standardization of individual responsibility for each position 
at each shift, insuring that every shift perform tasks in a similar manner. 
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RLWI  
 Too many 
procedures which 
causes 
coordination 
challenges and 
give rise to 
situations where 
some personnel 
indicated that 
they sometimes 
took shortcuts 
 
 Slow procedural 
updating system 
 
 
- If possible, reduce the number of procedures by merging two or more 
related procedures to decrease the number. This may reduce the dangerous 
potential for making mistakes, which are present. It can also contribute to 
hindering violation of procedures, and intentional or unintentional skipping 
of procedural steps. 
- Focus on using few words, use action verbs, precise language, together with 
a user friendly layout, presentation and graphics whenever possible. 
- Focus on procedural training and increase the focus on the importance of 
following the procedures, and also the importance of taking their time when 
performing tasks and not to take procedural shortcuts. 
- Streamline the procedural updating system through proper training of the 
personnel responsible for the updating and progress. 
- Place higher demands to the procedural updating system, and put focus to 
the importance of effective procedural updating. 
- A team or group of people should have been responsible for reducing the 
number of procedures and better the procedural updating system, and to 
implement measures to do this. 
 Human body 
“resting modus” 
and managers not 
accepting this 
 
- Performing training, operational activities, social activities, planning, team-
buildings during quiet periods where “resting modus” can be a challenge. 
- Develop a team responsible for keeping people “on alert” ready to face 
familiar and novel problems. 
- Perform management training to make managers focused on this challenge, 
and increase their ability to understand the situation and to make proper 
measures. 
 Split up 
management  
 Unclear 
“command lines” 
 
- This can be overcome by ensuring competency is achieved with cooperation 
and coordination training and taking time to analyze areas for improvement 
- Implement rules for standardization of how to get the organizations and its 
personnel to fully work as “one” unit. 
- Focus on “grey areas” in the reporting path and remove these areas by 
defining clear reporting paths.  
- Develop a team or a group responsible for keeping focus on the humans and 
organization, and the value of working as one unit, and how this can be 
done. Maybe a clear and user friendly scheme or diagram can be made to 
show the “one” organization and its “command lines” which can be 
displayed or posted readily available to the personnel at the walls or intranet. 
 Several shifts do 
things differently 
with lack of task 
standardization 
 
- Focus on standardized task training. 
- Focus on an incorporation and standardization of rules of how thing are 
going to be performed. 
- Standardization of when and how often to “take over the helm” for the 
operator to take a break. 
- Develop a team across the “shift boundaries” which has the responsibility of 
insuring that tasks are conducted in a standardized manner. 
 
 Difficult to reach 
the right 
resources during 
holydays, 
weekends etc. 
- Develop an onshore teams that can be “on watch”, with the correct 
competency. 
- Conduct specialized training. 
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AX-S  
 Operators are still 
in the learning 
and 
familiarization 
phase 
 
- Implement standardized and adapted training in as early stages as possible. 
- Log “lessons learned” along the way to not “forget” important experiences. 
Develop job aids, for example a system reporting “lessons learned” which 
can be readily available for the personnel. 
- Implement standardized and adapted rules and procedures of how tasks shall 
be performed, and define individual responsibilities and focus on 
streamlining the HMI systems and optimizing the GUI. 
- Study other SWI concepts and learn from their mistakes, miscalculation and 
misdiagnosis to improve the AX-S concept, but also focus on learning from 
what they do well. 
 Automation 
system in the 
early stages, and  
is a relatively 
outdated 
computer system 
 
- Update the system through research of new computer systems, and study 
other SWI concepts computer systems to learn from their pros/cons. 
- Develop a group of people responsible for updating the system with an 
extensive use of clear symbols and high-level information, and the 
possibility to easily access the low-level information. 
 Too much manual 
handling vs. 
automation 
handling 
 
- Identify which manual tasks should be automatic and implement measures 
to make the proper amount of tasks automatic vs. manual. 
- Implement a team responsible for identifying the optimal amount of manual 
handling vs. automation handling. 
 Not produced 
enough 
procedures yet 
 
- Here AX-S has the opposite challenge compared to the RLWI, but this is 
due to the fact that the concept is still in the commercial phase. It is 
important to put a focus on making the proper and balanced amount of 
procedures, but not too many which may result in slip, lapses, mistakes and 
shortcuts. 
- Use few words, use action verbs, precise language, user friendly layout with 
presentations, graphics whenever possible. 
- Perform procedural review and courses to increase the understanding of the 
contents. 
- Implement proper demands and routines to the procedural updating system.  
- Hinder “out of sight out of mind” issues by implementing a team or group 
responsible for effective and continually updating of procedures. 
 Allocation of 
responsibility is 
unclear for some 
of the personnel 
 
- Training and courses explaining and defining the allocation of 
responsibilities and reporting paths. Focus on how important it is that each 
and everyone know the allocation of responsibility. 
- Maybe a clear visually scheme or diagram which is easy to understand can 
be made to show the organization and its allocation of responsibilities which 
can be displayed or posted readily available to the personnel at the walls or 
intranet. 
- Develop a team or a group responsible for keeping focus on the humans and 
organization, and the value of knowing the allocation of responsibility and 
how this can be done.  
 New, immature 
team still 
undergoing 
“storming” phase 
of the team 
dynamics 
 
- Sufficient time allocated for standardized and adapted training. 
- Team-buildings/activities for the new teams to get to know each other 
- Standardize the way tasks will be performed at each shift. 
- Continuous constructive feedback from the management to improve the 
cooperation and team dynamics, and to improve the working environment 
and  insure that each  individual know that they are doing a correct and good 
job and that they are being corrected when they can do something better. 
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5. Discussion and Recommendations 
Now as the challenges and improvement opportunities have been presented, this chapter will 
discuss the RLWI- and AX-S concepts similarities and differences based on the identified 
challenges, together with some further improvement recommendations and suggestions to 
further studies.  
 
The RLWI- and AX-S concepts certainly have one thing in common, the complexity. 
According to Rossnes, Guttormsen, Steiro Tinmannsvik and Herrera (2004) many activities 
take place in parallel in complex systems and these parallel activities may interact in non-
obvious manners if the system is characterized by high interactive complexity. For the 
personnel at the RLWI- and AX-S vessels it is challenging to maintain a complete overview 
over parallel activities, procedures, monitors and the situation on deck, while communicating, 
cooperating and contributing to decision making between the different levels of authority and 
at the same time have an acceptable work performance. There is a diverse range of tasks 
characterized by high interactive complexity to be performed both physical and mental, some 
tedious or repetitive while others are unique. By streamlining the decision, reporting, 
information, communication and cooperation processes, and by increasing the personnel’s 
understanding and knowledge of their individual tasks and of the entire concept through 
proper training, one can contribute to an improved decision making and work performance. 
 
The fact that there is some lack of space in the cabins is more or less a general challenge at all 
the vessels. To contribute to optimize decision making and work performance at the RLWI 
vessel, there should have been made a workstation in the Tower Cabin for the holding of the 
many necessary paper-procedures to contribute to improve the context the activities are 
performed in. This will better the possibility to maintain a good procedural and situational 
overview since the space around the operator’s chairs, especially the WOCS operator, is not 
physically suited for paper work at this time. It may also contribute to reduce some cluttering 
at the workplace in the Tower Cabin. The ergonomically design of the desks and chairs are 
good according to the operators at the RLWI vessel. The Deployment- and Intervention Cabin 
at the AX-S vessel have, like the Tower Cabin, room for improvements. Some personnel felt 
that the cabins could have been bigger. By improving the space and design the work 
performance can be increased which again can contribute to success and higher income due to 
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more streamlined activities in an optimized context. The stations in the Deployment Cabin are 
better worked in standing position, which is tiring after 12 hours. The existing chairs in this 
cabin are designed as “bar” chairs with no back support, and the material is quite hard with no 
pillow or soft material in the seat. There should have been designed comfortable chairs where 
the personnel could sit down and rest his/her legs and back, and which fits under the panel 
station. Measures can be made to enable the work system to function better by improving the 
interactions between the human component and other components at the vessels. 
The condition under which decisions are made, strongly influence the outcomes and decision 
processes (Rossnes, 2001), and according to Hollnagel (1984) the decisions the person makes 
can shape the performance. The noise is a part of the physical context in the Tower Control at 
the RLWI vessel and is mainly caused by crowding and walk-throughs, which is a part of the 
social context. The “sign in and out” registration process could have been changed or moved 
to a less critical location to reduce some of the traffic. The heavy doors which are opening and 
closing could be improved by putting better “breaks” on the doors causing them to be closed 
more gently, or by making stricter access restrictions to hinder crowning. By making clearer 
signs at the doors and by putting more focus on not to disturb the operators in the Tower 
Control together with an underlining of the importance of this, can increase personnel 
performance and decrease the risks of making slips, lapses and mistakes. The cabinets and 
computer equipment can be moved to reduce noise, which was suggested by the operators. 
Measures could also have been made to reduce the noise from the air condition. Working 
conditions must be provided to enable the operators to function efficiently without distraction 
to ensure a safe operation of the system (Wong, 2002). According to Bailey (1996) the 
designer or engineer should understand the human qualities, characteristics and deficiencies, 
and in the best possible way take them into account when producing the system and making 
decisions. The AX-S personnel in the Deployments- and Intervention Cabins were not 
bothered with noise due to crowding and walk-throughs to the same extent as the RLWI 
personnel, but during some periods of the commissioning and training phase there were some 
crowding in the cabins since many people are involved. Measures can be done here to hinder 
that the cabins become the “center at the deck” for discussions and questions in the future. 
Like the RLWI personnel in the Tower Control they are bothered with noise disturbances 
from the climate control adjustment. Also, the computer cooling system in the Deployment 
Cabin makes disturbing noises. Measures could be made here to reduce the noise by changing 
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or adjusting the system. It is also considerable noise from one of the power conversion 
systems located in the Intervention Cabin and noise insulation would benefit here.  
 
At the RLWI vessel the tower- and wireline operator’s view out the windows can be 
improved to increase work performance and to contribute to safer decision making. The 
operator’s chair, monitors and sticks can be moved or adjusted, the windows can be adjusted 
or maybe some arrangements and modifications can be done to the disturbing beams to 
improve the context. In the AX-S Deployment Cabin, measures like raising the floor have 
already been made due to lack of adequate vision out the windows. Still, the cabin affords a 
limited view of the back deck area. More measures should be made to improve the view out 
the windows by “redesigning” the cabin. A stool is placed by the panels which the operators 
can step on to, but this is not satisfying from my point of view. There are cameras monitoring 
the deck area, but due to safety reasons it is important to be able to look out the windows 
while performing the activities. It can be quite dangerous to depend on the technology and the 
cameras monitoring, since a “worst case scenario” can be that critical camera monitoring fails 
during critical operations.  
 
The personnel at the RLWI vessel did not mention challenges due to too bright lightning, or 
due to dark work stations, and they did not mention bad air quality. Some personnel at the 
AX-S vessel’s Bridge were bothered with bright lightning from the windows which are a part 
of the physical context. The light blinded them when looking at the screens, but this can easily 
be fixed by using blinds or curtains. From my point of view, when visiting the vessel it was 
dark in the Intervention Cabin, which had no windows since no deck monitoring was needed 
during operation. I felt that the room was too dark to achieve healthy working conditions. 
From my point of view, a window with blinds could have been mounted in the cabin 
providing the possibility to let in some daylight, together with some extra lamps at the 
working desks to be able to read procedures under correct lightning conditions. The climate 
control adjustment in the Deployments- and Intervention Cabins is limited causing bad air 
quality, especially in the Intervention Cabin. Measures should be made here to increase the 
quality of the air provided to the personnel. The lightning and air quality can be measured by 
professionals to adapt them to the humans and to the HSE requirements. 
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From a human-machine interaction view errors often occurs as a result of a human-machine 
mismatch between the demands of the task, the characteristics of the interface provided to 
enable the person to carry out the task and the physical capabilities of the person (Redmill and 
Rajan, 1997). At the RLWI vessel some personnel mentioned that there are at times too many 
alarms at the panels, where many of the alarms are “nice to know” alarms. Measures have 
been performed to remove redundant alarms, but it is difficult to assess the importance of 
them. Also, the many alarms did not give guidance to the actions the operator should take in 
the situation when performing the activities. Especially the WOCS control program is very 
complex, and it can be difficult to identify the error when one occurs due to a lack of a clear 
early alarm when something is abnormal to help the operator to prioritize the alarms. More 
measures should be performed to remove redundant alarms, and to improve the clarity of 
alarms and action guidance. The operator knowledge should be used in the process to assess 
the importance of the alarms. Also, more extensive use of symbols and graphs could 
contribute to clear early warnings, where thousands of parameters can be plotted in the graph 
to provide an overview. If the operator needs more detailed information, he/she can click on 
the graph that provides low-level and detailed information. The WOCS operator, which will 
sit in the AX-S Interventions Cabin, is not yet hired due to the fact that the concept is still in 
the commissioning phase, and therefore not all of the positions and shifts are filled yet. 
Therefore, it is not possible to compare the RLWI and AX-S WOCS operators working 
conditions. The operators GUI- and HMI- systems in the Deployment- and Intervention 
Cabins are, just like at the RLWI vessel, ranked as complex and comprehensive. The AX-S 
panel’s functional characteristics and clarity of signals was ranked as fairly good, but it was 
sometimes difficult to detect the error when something happens during operation. In contrast 
to the RLWI systems, the AX-S systems are in the early stages and the automated side is not 
operating to its full potential. Some personnel mentioned that the AX-S computer system 
hardware was relatively outdated since the system has been in development for some time. 
Newer implementations of the computer system could be simpler, more efficient and could 
have contributed to increased work performance.  
 
Presently there is still a reasonable amount of manual handling required and this should be 
changed to automation handling once the system becomes operational. According to Bailey 
(1996) it is important to know which types of work can be performed by people and what can 
best be performed by computer- or automation systems. Compared to the RLWI concept the 
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possibility for making mistakes is high as the AX-S is a brand new concept and everyday 
personnel are learning and gaining experience, but it is still too early to be able to accurately 
quantify the human-machine match effectiveness of the system. The AX-S personnel 
knowledge about the automated part of the system was ranked as low compared to the RLWI 
concept, since many operators do not understand the whole picture yet and is still in the 
learning phase. 
 
Common for both of the concepts are challenges related to too many routine and repetitive 
tasks. The personnel in the Tower Control, Deployment- and Intervention Cabins and Bridge 
have a monitoring task, working 12 hours shifts monitor the screens and deck, and it lays in 
the human nature the risk of losing focus in such situations. Some personnel at the RLWI 
vessel said that it varied for how long an operator sat in the Tower Control during one shift, 
and when somebody “took over the helm”. This should be standardized. The AX-S personnel 
did not mention any experienced challenges so far of great variations from one shift group to 
another when it comes this, due to the early stages of the concept. Also, the “weak point” 
where that few people can perform the WOCS task as the RLWI vessel if he/she needs a 
break or replacement should be improved. For both of the concepts there have been registered 
a mismatch between mental and physical capabilities of humans and the demand of the job 
performed, but is not frequent. There have been personnel that have lacked the technical 
ability and competence required to support systems that is so technologically advanced. For 
the AX-S concept it can be difficult to find people with the right competence, due to the fact 
that it is many completely new aspects of the concept. Training has to be prioritized in the 
future. 
 
The petroleum industry comprises a growing number of Integrated Operation (IO), based on 
information and communication technology (ICT) advances (PSA, 2011), and systems 
become more complex and opaque to the people who manage and operate them (Reason, 
1997). The managers and operators at the RLWI vessel reported some challenges related the 
amount of information and documentation provided to the personnel and “Information 
overload” was sometimes a challenge leading to reduced work performance and poor decision 
making. This especially applies to the mobilization and demobilization which is quite hectic. 
Also, communication and information transfer challenges where identified at the vessel. 
Many additional personnel are boarding when the vessel reaches the dock, increasing the 
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communication and information transfer complexity. The crew felt that the amount of 
information presented to the managers and operators during RLWI operation was not optimal. 
Since the AX-S concept is not commercialized yet, they do not have the same mobilization 
and demobilization information and communication challenges as the personnel at the RLWI 
vessel. But, today they feel that the amount of information presented to the managers or to the 
operators in the cabins performing AX-S operations is not optimal, just like for the RLWI-
concept, and there are sometimes tendencies of “information overload” which have led to 
reduced human performance and poor/confusing decision making. Also, measures could have 
been made to improve the communication and cooperation between the managers and 
between the managers and operators. The processes are not fully streamlined yet and some 
feel that too much information is going back and forth between too many reporting levels. 
The experienced operators at the RLWI vessel feel that they can handle the large amounts of 
information quite well to a certain extent, but new personnel may struggle with “information 
overload”. The AX-S personnel have been on the project for a long period and through the 
build phase, therefore information has been easier to take onboard as information has been at 
a steady flow. Although for new personnel it is not easy. The great amount of information is a 
challenge, and the organizations must adopt mechanisms to process this large amount of 
information and focus on structure and training within this area. 
 
The RLWI procedures are accurate, clear, detailed and easy to use, but some personnel 
experienced challenges related to the number of procedures and a relatively slow procedural 
updating system. Measures like combining two or more procedures can contribute to reduce 
the number and thereby contribute to hinder violation of procedures, and intentional or 
unintentional skipping of procedural steps. This may reduce the dangerous potential for 
making mistakes, which are present. Also, if measures like implementing the “Step-ladder” 
model described earlier are conducted, one of the advantages according to Hollnagel (1984) is 
that it specifies the correct and complete way to execute the task/procedure and it also 
accounts for the various ways in which shortcuts may be made. Such an implementation can 
contribute to streamline the decision process, improving work performance and map various 
ways in which shortcuts can be made. A high number of procedures can, together with other 
information- and documentation complexities, lead to “information overload” and “absence” 
to a certain extent according to the personnel. They have also experienced pressure from 
different clients and personnel to skip steps in the procedures, or to do it in a different order. 
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Therefore it is important to further develop an open culture in the psychological context and 
show the importance of being critical to the management decisions, and other decisions, and 
to think the situation through before taking action. It is important to have the attention on 
developing a safety culture, including training and education related to the work performed. 
The slow procedural updating system should have been streamlined to increase the speed of 
the procedural updating. The AX-S procedures are currently still being developed and are 
being issued in “draft” format and it is not produced enough procedures yet. Therefore it is 
natural that the personnel knowledge about the content and requirements of the procedures are 
not satisfying at this time, and therefore training and courses is important in the future. Some 
mentioned that there is a concern that the management will implement rules and safety 
requirement purely to satisfy clients rather than considering the practical benefits and aspects, 
but this can be hindered by putting focus on this concern both among the crew and the 
specific people responsible for making the rules and procedures. 
Both the RLWI- and AX-S concepts have challenges with the availability of the correct 
personnel with the right competence. The RLWI personnel felt that the resource availability 
was currently low due to a competitive market, and this is a challenge many companies in the 
industry experience at this time. They also experienced challenges with the availability of 
onshore resources during the weekends and holidays and the personnel felt that it was 
important to be critical to decisions in such situations. This should have been put more focus 
to and measures should have been made. Also, somebody mentioned that in quiet periods it 
was almost too many persons at the RLWI vessel, and they could go for days without having 
much to do. During quiet periods measures like performing training, activities, planning, 
team-buildings etc. could keep people motivated, on “alert” and updated, which can 
contribute to decrease the possibility of making slips, lapses and mistakes when the operation 
starts up again. Due to the commercial phase, the AX-S concept does not have the right 
amount of personnel yet, and it is also difficult to find the correct people with relevant 
experience to the new concept. Nobody has similar experiences from such a concept to relate 
to. Therefore it is important that they have a great focus on training in the future. The RLWI 
personnel training was ranked as good, but according to the crew it was always room for 
improvements. They wished for a better sharing of experience and “lessons learned” from 
previous operation which could have contributed to better decision making and improved 
work performance. This can be put focus to through training, to make all of the personnel 
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aware of the importance of this. At present it is too early to accurately comment on the AX-S 
training, though training is planned in the near term. The sharing of experience is quite good 
at this stage, but it is always room for improvements such as for the RLWI concept.  
Due to poor planning and concurrent plans, wrong decisions and performance degradation has 
occurred at the RLWI vessel. Also, the personnel felt that nobody holds the record of 
everything that happens and will happen during mobilization and demobilization, which may 
cause plan deviations. There should have been one group of people responsible for keeping 
track of the processes and tasks. The AX-S concept does not have the same challenges since it 
is still in the commercial phase, but decisions errors or work performance reduction due to 
poor planning, concurrent plans and communication before or during testing of the AX-S 
operations have happened, and sometimes happens too often. This is the result of combination 
of factors according to the personnel; contractual complexities between Havila Phoenix/AX-
S/Salt Subsea/Fugro, an immature team still undergoing “storming” phase of the team 
dynamics, and a level of manning below that which is needed to effectively operate the AX-S 
system during full operations. The survey showed that the group dynamics, relationships, 
cooperation and team work during RLWI are very good due to incorporation focus during the 
many years of operation, but as mentioned earlier some improvement opportunities were 
identified at the Island Wellserver. A cooperation challenge at the RLWI vessels are due to 
several different shifts doing things differently and the personnel ask for more incorporation 
and standardization of how activities and tasks should be performed. Measures should have 
been performed here with focus on standardization and training. At the AX-S vessel the 
existing team structures are not ranked as optimal to execute safe and acceptable decision 
making and work performance and the relationships and cooperation is not optimal yet since 
they are still in the early phases, but the existing team works very well together. Further 
incorporation, optimization and training should be in focus. 
 
When it comes to the organization and management, both RLWI and AX-S have challenges. 
The personnel at the RLWI vessel experience organizational and management challenges like 
too much swapping of crew constellations, complex decision making going through the 
onshore facility, for some unclear allocation and distribution of responsibilities, grey areas in 
the reporting path, a sometimes ineffective management level due to the split up management 
level between IOS, FMC and AWS, and unclear “command lines” and individual 
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responsibility. These challenges can quickly contribute to disturbances in the system. It 
should have been made more dedicated responsibilities to the individuals onboard with clearer 
standardized guidelines from the onshore organizations. Also, some personnel felt that some 
managers and supervisors were afraid of taking necessary decisions, thereby using an 
unnecessary amount of time. The operators felt that the managers did not trust their decision 
and knowledge, and that the management maybe lacked the right knowledge to make 
effective, safe and right operational decisions. From the operator point of view, they need 
more operational training and courses to understand the “whole operational picture”. Today, 
such management training are not frequent and could have contributed to saving time and 
leading to a more effective decision making and work performance, but it can also contribute 
to increasing the safety. AX-S experience some of the same organizational and management 
challenges like complex decision making, and unclear allocation of responsibility and a 
definition of individual responsibilities, but they also experience some challenges related to 
politics, power struggles, perceptions of performance and attitude differences between 
contractors and staff, new operation and a newly formed operational team combined with the 
development of a new concept. Also, one of the challenges is ensuring that the personnel 
understand and use the correct chain of command, to ensure that coherent, clear and 
consistent decisions can be made. As mentioned earlier, the AX-S the organizational diagram 
is not yet finished and the allocation is still in the early stages, but training and focus on these 
challenges can contribute to increase the awareness and to improve the situation. 
 
Both the RLWI- and AX-S personnel experience some attitude and motivation challenges. 
According to Bailey (1996) the human is the most complex of the three elements in the 
human performance model. At the RLWI vessel it may be a challenge to keep people 
motivated with a lot of waiting due to weather conditions, downtime, flawless periods, and 
other causes, leading to frustration and demotivation for some. A normal human body 
reaction is to put themselves in a “resting modus” during such periods. The survey showed 
that some personnel felt that the leaders must accept that this is a challenge, and that some 
“arrogant” leaders did not accept this fact. Measures could be conducted to put focus on this 
fact, to achieve that all the leaders accept that this is a challenge, and to insure that they 
contribute to increased motivation and earn the right skills to implement the correct measures. 
AX-S also experiences some attitude and motivation challenges where personnel becomes 
frustrated and/or demoralized as the system is not yet commercial and a lot of personnel are 
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required to work for longer periods offshore resulting in lack of enthusiasm and drive. This is 
due to the commercial phase, and is expected to improve when new shifts arrive and the 
concept becomes commercial. It is still important to keep focus on the attitude and 
motivational factors in the future and to implement this in the personnel training. 
 
Another challenge the RLWI concept faces from some personnel’s point of view is the long-
term goals of the organization. Personnel at the vessel felt that no one took the hold of this, 
and felt that the organizations needed a decision on which direction they will choose in the 
future to maintain and increase performance. Nobody uses resources on innovation and 
development from some RLWI personnel’s point of view. Maybe a specialized team, 
consisting of all types of personnel and experiences can come together and suggest future 
directions by using the operators and managers’ knowledge and suggestions, and make the 
personnel aware of that the long-term goals are in progress. AX-S is a new and innovative 
concept taking the risk of developing something which has not been tested before. The AX-S 
organization has taken a decision on which direction they will choose, and are taking chances 
and risking money to succeed with their concept. 
 
It would have been interesting to perform a closer and deeper study of the situations at the 
RLWI- and the AX-S vessels, not only from a human perspective but also from a 
technological- and organizational perspective. I will suggest that the challenges identified 
from a human perspective should be further studied for both the RLWI- and AX-S concepts, 
combined with a deep study of the technology- and organization elements, together with a 
study of the HTO interactions. A further mapping of the concepts, from a HTO- and HTO 
interactions perspective can, from my point of view, contribute to a trustworthy and accurate 
human, technological and organizational focused best practice formulation. I also suggest that 
other colleges and universities should increase the HTO focus and implement the HTO area as 
a subject in their bachelor or Master’s degrees, with the University of Stavanger as an 
example. This will, from my point of view, give the students a valuable knowledge and 
understanding of the human-technology-organization aspects and complexity, which will be 
useful both for the students and the industry they will enter in the future. 
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6. Conclusion 
As presented in this thesis, SWI operations have several sensitive work settings which can 
affect decision making and work performance, and it exists many measures that can 
contribute to better the situation. In order to improve the decision making and work 
performance at the vessels, an understanding and identifications of the challenges that may 
have a critical effect is required. An incorporation of a human perspective can contribute to a 
better understanding of these effects. The challenges can be identified and presented by using 
the PIFs and error causation paradigms with reference to the human performance model. 
Based on the collected data from the interviewed personnel, the challenges within the thesis’ 
scope were identified and showed that a wide range of factors can introduce different effects. 
A proper knowledge and analysis of the complex work settings from a human perspective, 
can give the personnel a better working environment and an opportunity to improve the 
decision making, work performance and work situation. It is important to identify and 
underline the challenges to provide a good overview and to achieve a safe, optimal and 
productive operation. As Niccolo Machiavelli once wrote “a common failing of mankind is to 
never to anticipate a storm when the sea is calm”. By providing the challenges presented in 
this thesis, I believe that the identification can contribute to improve the decision making and 
work performance situation at the SWI vessels, and that it can help to insure that the 
personnel can be “prepared for a storm” or hinder “a storm”. 
I wish to take Charles Percy Snow’s quotation from year 1971 a bit further by adapting it to 
the views and system’s complexity in today’s industry. One can from my point of view say 
that:  The human, technology and organization elements are a queer thing. They bring you 
great gifts with one hand, but they can stab you in the back with the other if not handled 
correctly. Let us avoid that the settings within the HTO elements and the HTO interactions 
stabs us in the back. To be able to avoid such situations and to implement the correct 
measures, one has to study the elements both separately and combined. Therefore, my 
recommendations are further studies of the identified challenges presented in this thesis from 
a human perspective, combined with studies of the technology- and organization elements and 
the HTO interactions at the vessels. Combining the studies with relevant solutions and 
implementations of proactive measures can result in a complete “best practice”.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 – Interview guide 
 
Interview: 
- Mapping of decision making and work performance during complex SWI-operations 
1. Mapping of the workplace design and work situation 
 
1. Can you shortly describe the existing SWI operating teams and what their tasks are at the 
vessel? (WOCS-, Tower -, Wireline- and ROV operators etc.)  
2. Where do the different operators (WOCS-, Tower -, Wireline- and ROV operators etc.) 
and managers have their “work base” at the vessel?  
3. How is the ergonomic design of the “control room” (concerned with human anatomy with 
placement of screens, chairs and panels, and disturbance, noise, mental processes like 
memory, mental workload, work stress, working hours etc.) adapted to the humans? 
4. How does the design of the “control room” affect human work performance and decision 
making? (Does the design hinder or reduce human performance effectiveness, or the 
opposite?) 
 
A. How happy are you with the control center and cabins workplace arrangement?  
Very bad      Very good                                                
B. How does noise, vibration, temperature, air quality, lighting, space or other 
environmental disturbing factors affect the decision making processes at the vessel?  
Very much    Very little                                                
C. How does noise, vibration, temperature, air quality, lighting, space or other 
environmental disturbing factors affect the human work performance at the vessel?  
Very much    Very little      
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2. Automation and human capabilities 
 
1. Which factors challenge or affect decision making and human performance when it 
comes to the degree of automation (of work tasks for example of the tasks in the 
control room monitoring programs? Is too much automated, and too little amount of 
tasks left to humans to perform, or the opposite?) in the “control room”? 
2. How frequent does mistakes happened when a person is faced with an unfamiliar 
situation during SWI operations at the vessel? 
3. Is it sometimes uncertainties where and when to focus your attention in the automated 
part of the system in control center? 
4. Have mistakes ever happened due to a person is faced with an environment for which 
no “know-how” or “rules for control” are available from previous experience? 
5. How is the relationship between the demands of the tasks in the “control room”, and 
the physical and psychological capabilities of the operator?  
 
A. Is the relationship between automated and non-automated tasks in the control 
center optimal?  
Not optimal  Optimal                   
B. How is the personnel knowledge about the automated part of the system? 
Very bad       Very good                                                
C. How do you classify the human-machine (in the “control room”) match/mismatch?  
Mismatch      Match  
D. Are the control panel functional characteristics, clarity of signals and user 
friendliness satisfying? 
Unsatisfying   Satisfying 
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3. Procedures, forms and personnel training 
 
1. Are the procedures accurate, clear, detailed and easy enough to use? 
2. Have you experienced violation of procedures and rules, or other “risk-taking” 
personnel behavior which have challenged safe and effective decision making and 
human performance at the vessel? 
 
A. How satisfying are the number of procedures? Too many vs. too few? 
Too many      Too few 
B. How is the personnel knowledge about the content and requirements of the 
procedures? 
Very bad        Very good                                                
C. What is the frequency of use of forms when performing a work task? 
Too often       Too rare 
D. Is there often an overlap between forms/procedures when performing a work task? 
Very often      Very rare 
E. How satisfying is the personnel training?  
Unsatisfying   Satisfying 
F. How is the personnel knowledge about the SWI technology and equipment? 
Very bad        Very good                                                
G. Are the right skilled and experienced personnel hired?  
Shortcomings  Professionals 
H. Is the number of employees satisfying? 
Unsatisfying    Satisfying 
I. How is the resource availability? 
Very bad        Very good                                                
J. How is the sharing of experience and knowledge among the personnel at the 
vessel? 
Unsatisfying     Satisfying 
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4. Management, allocation of responsibility and planning  
 
1. How are the management practices in the decision making processes during SWI? 
Any challenges? 
2. How is the allocation of responsibility at the vessel, and do you see any challenges 
here?  
3. Could another allocation of responsibility between the RLWI personnel at the vessel 
improve the decision making processes and make human performance more optimal? 
4. What organizational and management factors reduce or hinder the humans 
performance? What are the challenges here? 
5. Have you ever experienced decision errors or performance reduction due to poor 
planning and communication before or during SWI operations? If yes, explain shortly. 
 
A. In the day-to-day work there is no doubt about who is responsible for the different 
tasks. 
Disagree         Agree 
B. Is there a problem with concurrent plans (the holding of more than one plan or 
intention at once) during RLWI? 
Very often       Very rare 
C. Are there ever tendencies to use plans or rules which have worked before during 
RLWI, but which may not be useful in the present situation? 
Very often       Very rare 
D. How do you evaluate the complexity of the managers work tasks? 
Too complex   Too simple 
E. How effective are the communication and cooperation between the managers? 
Ineffective         Effective 
F. How effective are the communication and cooperation between the operators? 
Ineffective         Effective 
G. How effective are the communication and cooperation between the managers and 
operators? 
Ineffective        Effective 
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5. Personnel behavior and safety 
 
1. Have you experienced human failures, work performance reduction or unsatisfying 
decision making attributed to attitude and motivational causes? If yes, explain shortly. 
2. Have you ever experienced intentional violations or routine violations attributed to 
attitude and motivational causes? If yes, explain shortly. 
3. Have you ever experienced mismatch between mental and physical capabilities of people 
and the demand of the job performed? If yes, explain shortly. 
4. Is there a frequency of slips and lapses types of errors occurring when a skilled person are 
performing a familiar task during SWI? If yes, explain shortly. 
5. Have you ever experienced “absentminded behavior” leading to slips of action or memory 
lapses during SWI? If yes, explain shortly. 
6. Have you ever experienced any decision making and work performance “corner cuttings” 
attributed to safety attitudes, beliefs, risk-taking behavior, conflict or motivation? If yes, 
explain shortly. 
 
A. How do you evaluate the complexity of the operators work tasks at the control panel? 
Too complex  Too simple 
B. How do you evaluate the complexity of the operators work tasks performing SWI 
operations? 
Too complex  Too simple 
C. How is the time pressure during SWI operations?   
Very often              Very rare 
D. How is the workload level during SWI operations? 
Too much              Too little  
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6. Information processing 
 
1. Is there sometimes a tendency of “information overload”, which have led to reduced 
human performance or poor/confusing decision making? 
2. Have you ever experienced attention errors due to human information processing issues of 
great amounts of information provided at the same time? 
 
A. Is the right amount of information presented to the managers during SWI? 
Too much      Too little  
B. Is the right amount of information presented to the operators in the control center 
during SWI? 
Too much      Too little  
C. Has there been a tendency to use familiar solutions when performing a task even when 
these are not the most convenient or efficient? 
Very often        Very rare 
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7. Team work 
 
1. How is the group dynamics, relationships, cooperation and team work at the vessel 
during SWI? 
2. How do the decision makers communicate any operational decision to the rest of the 
SWI team?  
3. Do you normally work with the same team members within your working area / 
working group, or does it vary? 
4. Is the working environment on board characterized by openness and dialog? 
 
A. How are the relationships and cooperation among different “social groups” or 
teams? 
Very bad          Very good    
B. How do you evaluate the complexity of the teams work tasks? 
Too complex    Too simple                                             
C. Do the teams solve problems and conflicts in a good manner? 
Very bad          Very good                                                
D. Are the existing team structures optimal to execute safe and acceptable decision 
making? 
Not optimal      Optimal                   
E. Are the existing team structures optimal to achieve acceptable work performance? 
Not optimal      Optimal                   
F. Is it difficult for the teams to share the same situation awareness during RLWI-
operations? 
Difficult          Easy                  
 
Other Suggestions or Comments_______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
